Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers for Strict Liability Offenses - Another View by Brickey, Kathleen F.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 35 
Issue 6 Issue 6 - November 1982 Article 2 
11-1982 
Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers for Strict Liability Offenses 
- Another View 
Kathleen F. Brickey 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Food and Drug Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers for Strict Liability Offenses - Another View, 35 
Vanderbilt Law Review 1337 (1982) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol35/iss6/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
Criminal Liability of Corporate
Officers for Strict Liability
Offenses - Another View*
Kathleen F. Brickey**
The Supreme Court has utilized a "responsible share" standard
to determine whether corporate officers should be held criminally lia-
ble for acts committed by their subordinates in violation of the penal
provisions of a corporate regulatory statute. In a recent article Profes-
sor Abrams postulated that courts will interpret the responsible share
standard to contain an element of culpability. In this article Professor
Brickey maintains that the Court's language and analysis support a
strict liability interpretation of the responsible share standard. Noting
that administrative enforcement practices tend to mitigate the poten-
tial harshness of a strict liability standard, Professor Brickey con-
cludes that this standard, rather than the standard proffered by Pro-
fessor Abrams, advances the goals of public welfare statutes and
promotes increased corporate responsibility.
I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of statutes regulating corporate conduct and
containing criminal penalties1 has increased the risk of unwitting
violations of the penal laws. In consequence, corporate officers,
managers, and supervisors face greater exposure to criminal prose-
cution for acts they commit in their official capacities. Many regu-
latory statutes, moreover, render corporate officials vulnerable to
* Copyright 0 1982 by Kathleen F. Brickey and the Vanderbilt Law Review. All rights
reserved.
** Professor of Law, Washington University. A.B., 1965, J.D., 1968, University of
Kentucky.
1. See, e.g., Tobacco Statistics Act § 3, 7 U.S.C. § 503 (1976); Dumping or Destruction
of Interstate Produce Act § 1, 7 U.S.C. § 491 (1976); National Housing Act of 1933 § 21, 12
U.S.C. § 378 (1976); Securities Act Amendments of 1975 § 27(d), 15 U.S.C. § 77yyy (1976);
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 §§ 103(a), 103(b), 104, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2,
78ff (1976 & Supp. I 1977); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1976);
Federal Trade Commission Act §§ 10, 14, 15 U.S.C. §§ 50, 54 (1976); Emergency Petroleum
Allocation Act of 1973 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 754 (1976); Toxic Substances Control Act §§ 15-16,
15 U.S.C. §§ 2614-2615 (1976); Wholesome Meat Act § 406, 21 U.S.C. § 676 (1976); Bank
Secrecy Act §§ 209-210, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1058-1059 (1976); Oil Pollution Act § 6, 33 U.S.C. §
1005 (1976); Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1976).
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prosecution for criminal conduct in which they did not personally
participate and about which they had no personal knowledge.2
Changing perceptions about the need to affix personal respon-
sibility for conduct that entangles the corporation in criminal vio-
lations have accompanied the emergence of such patterns of fed-
eral statutory law." When combined with the possible imposition of
greater penalties than in the past,4 this enhancement of a corpo-
rate officer's vulnerability to federal criminal prosecution makes
essential an understanding of the bases of individual liability for
business-related offenses.
The principal theories under which courts have held corporate
officers liable for criminal violations occurring within the corpora-
tion are three in number.5 First, one who performs an act consti-
2. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1976), has served
as the primary vehicle for articulation of this premise and was the basis of the prosecutions
in the cases considered in this Article. See also Free Trade Zone Act § 19, 19 U.S.C. § 81s
(1976) ("In case of a violation of this chapter, or any regulation under this chapter. . . by
. . . any officer, agent, or employee . . . responsible for or permitting any such violation
shall be subject to a fine... ... "); Obstructing Navigable Waters Act § 16, 33 U.S.C. § 411
(1976) ("Every person and every corporation that shall violate [§§ 407, 408, and 409 of the
Act] shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. . . ."); Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act § 38, 33 U.S.C. § 938 (1976) ("Any employer required to secure the payment
of compensation under this chapter who fails to secure such compensation shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor. . . ."); infra note 186 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Saxbe to Get Tough With Price-Fixers, [July-Dec.], ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) No. 683, at A-5 (Oct. 8, 1974) (summarizing a speech by then Attorney
General William B. Saxbe). In his speech, Saxbe expressed the following Justice Depart-
ment policy:
[D]uring the past fiscal year, the Department filed 34 criminal cases compared to
33 civil-and criminal defendants totaled 84 persons. The emphasis on criminal anti-
trust cases will continue-particularly on price fixing.... [W]e will generally seek
prison terms-for all who are convicted or who plead guilty or no contest. The time for
unequal justice is long since past.
Id.
See also Hearings on Kepone Contamination in Hopewell, Va., Before the Subcomm.
on Agricultural Research and General Legislation of the Senate Comm. on Agriculture and
Forestry, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1976) (statement of Senator Patrick J. Leahy) ("I hope
the U.S. Attorney, if he does decide to bring indictments, also brings indictments against
individuals, instead of corporate entities .... Maybe then the kind of responsibility that
everyone talks about having will actually come about.").
4. See, e.g., Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974 § 3, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 3
(1976) (reclassifying violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act from misdemeanor to felony, in-
creasing maximum fines for individual violators from $50,000 to $100,000, increasing maxi-
mum term of imprisonment from one year to three years, and also creating corporate fines
of up to $1,000,000).
5. Conspiracy doctrine provides a fourth theory under which a corporate officer may
be held accountable for crimes committed in furtherance of corporate activities. While the
importance of conspiracy doctrine in corporate criminal prosecutions is difficult to assess,
see Duke, Conspiracy, Complicity, Corporations, and Federal Code Reform, FORDHAM COR-
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tuting a criminal offense is personally accountable for the crime
even though the act complained of was an official act performed
during the course of the actor's employment.6 Courts historically
PoRATE LAW INSTITUTE, CRIMINAL LAW AND THE CORPORATE COUNSEL 56, 57 (1979), conspir-
acy is among the most frequently charged federal crimes. See Marcus, Conspiracy: The
Criminal Agreement in Theory and in Practice, 65 GEo. L.J. 925, 947 (1977); Selz, Conspir-
acy Law in Theory and in Practice: Federal Conspiracy Prosecutions in Chicago, 5 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 35, 48-50 (1977). Conspiracy doctrine is important, however, not only because it is
invoked so commonly by federal prosecutors, but also because it provides a basis for impos-
ing vicarious liability for crimes committed in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy.
In addition to their liability for the conspiracy offense, parties to a conspiracy may be
liable under the Pinkerton rule for substantive offenses that they did not personally com-
mit. The rule was first enunciated in Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). Not-
ing the well-settled principle that the overt acts of one conspirator may constitute the acts
of all parties to the conspiracy, the Court found that "[t]he governing principle is the same
when the substantive offense is committed by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the
unlawful project." Id. at 647. When parties join together in a conspiracy, they each contem-
plate conduct that furthers the conspiracy or achieves its unlawful object, and they all pos-
sess the requisite intent to complete the crime. Finding the case at hand analogous to those
involving the liability of an aider and abettor, the Court found the theories underlying both
to be premised on the same principle and concluded that if an overt act "can be supplied by
the act of one conspirator, we fail to see why the same or other acts in furtherance of the
conspiracy are likewise not attributable to the others for the purpose of holding them re-
sponsible for the substantive offense." Id. Thus, participation in a conspiracy may result in
imposition of liability for a crime consummated by another on the basis of a theory that is
wholly independent of established principles of accomplice liability. Cf. United States v.
Cowart, 595 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1979) (conspiracy is an offense separate and distinct from
aiding and abetting); infra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
The Court in Pinkerton limited this species of liability, however, by acknowledging that
the case would have been different if one of three possibilities had materialized: (1) the
substantive offense had happened to be committed by one of the conspirators but was not
committed in furtherance of the conspiracy; (2) the offense, even though committed to fur-
ther the conspiratorial objectives, had not been within the scope of the unlawful project; or
(3) the offense had been "merely a part of the ramifications of the plan which could not be
reasonably foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement." 328
U.S. at 647-48.
6. United States v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 639, 644 (D.D.C. 1962);
see, e.g., United States v. Amrep Corp., 560 F.2d 539 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015
(1977) (affirming convictions of corporation and officers for mail and interstate land sale
fraud); United States v. Sherpix, Inc., 512 F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 948 (1971) (upholding price-fixing convictions of corporate president, vice presi-
dent, board member, and sales manager); United States v. Andreadis, 366 F.2d 423 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967) (affirming convictions of corporation and its presi-
dent for mail and wire fraud, misbranding drug, and conspiracy); United States v. Carter,
311 F.2d 934 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 915 (1963) (upholding conviction of corporate
president and chief executive officer for making unlawful payments to union representa-
tives); Farrell v. United States, 321 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 992
(1964) (upholding conviction of vice president and director for mail fraud, securities fraud,
and conspiracy); United States v. Empire Packing Co., 174 F.2d 16 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
337 U.S. 959 (1949) (upholding conviction of president and owner of company for filing false
claims for government subsidies); Nye & Nissen v. United States, 168 F.2d 846 (9th Cir.
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have recognized that proposition despite the corporate agent's
claim that he was acting for the corporation in an official or repre-
sentative capacity." A corporate agent may not use the corporate
entity as a shield against personal liability for his own misdeeds.8
1948), afl'd, 336 U.S. 613 (1949) (affirming convictions of corporation and its president for
conspiracy to defraud the United States); United States v. Hare, 153 F.2d 816 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 328 U.S. 836 (1946) (upholding convictions of president, treasurer, and secre-
tary for violation of Emergency Price Control Act); United States v. Bach, 151 F.2d 177 (7th
Cir. 1945) (upholding conviction of salesman for violation of Emergency Price Control Act);
C.I.T. Corp. v. United States, 150 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1945) (upholding conviction of sales
manager for conspiracy to make false statements); Gates v. United States, 122 F.2d 571
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 698 (1941) (upholding convictions of owner and officer for
mail fraud, securities fraud, and conspiracy); Mininsohn v. United States, 101 F.2d 477 (3d
Cir. 1939) (upholding convictions of corporation and its officers for conspiracy to defraud
the government); United States v. Colosse Cheese and Butter Co., 133 F. Supp. 953
(N.D.N.Y. 1955) (denying motion to dismiss prosecution of manager for violation of Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act). See generally 3A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRI-
VATE CORPORATIONS §§ 1348-49 (perm. ed. 1975).
7. See, e.g., Elsberry v. State, 52 Ala. 8, 10 (1875) (upholding conviction of defendant
stockholder and superintendent for conducting corporate business without required license:
"it is the natural persons in and by whom it [the corporation] lives, moves, and operates
that the law generally holds responsible for its offences against the public"); State v. Great
Works Milling & Mfg. Co., 20 Me. 41, 44 (1841) (holding indictment of corporation im-
proper: "when a crime or misdemeanor is committed under color of corporate authority, the
individuals acting in the business . . . should be indicted"); Moore v. State, 48 Miss. 147
(1873), writ dismissed, 88 U.S. 636 (1875) (indictment of corporation's agent for selling lot-
tery ticket); Cowley v. People, 83 N.Y. 464 (1881) (upholding conviction of agent of incorpo-
rated benevolent association for endangering the welfare of a child); State v. Patton, 26 N.C.
16 (1843) (indictment of president and directors of turnpike company for letting turnpike
become ruinous: "the individuals . . . were bound, by virtue of their offices, faithfully to
exert all their powers and apply all their means, as such officers, to the keeping of the road
in order; and . . . for a default in this public duty they were liable"); The Queen v. Ste-
phens, 1 L.R.-Q.B. 702 (1866) (upholding conviction of quarry owner whose employees dis-
charged waste into river without his knowledge); cf. State v. Morris & E. R.R. Co., 23 N.J.L.
360 (1852) (holding potential liability of agent no bar to prosecution of corporation); Ex
parte Schmidt, 2 Tex. App. 196 (1877) (local agent of company that conducted marine and
fire insurance business liable for delinquent tax); The Queen v. Great North of England Ry.
Co., 115 Eng. Rep. 1294 (Q.B. 1846) (holding corporation indictable though responsible indi-
viduals may also be liable). Corporate officers were indicted for Sherman Act violations in
40 cases between 1890 and 1914 alone. United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 407 n.1 (1962).
For the historical context within which this principle developed, see generally Brickey,
Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an Observation, 60 WASH. U.L.Q.
393 (1982).
8. State v. Cooley, 141 Tenn. 33, 206 S.W. 182 (1918); Milbrath v. State, 138 Wis. 354,
361, 120 N.W. 252, 254-55 (1909). See also Kopald-Quinn & Co. v. United States, 101 F.2d
628, 632 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 628 (1939) (upholding conviction of corporation
and certain agents for fraudulent sale of worthless stock); Wood v. United States, 204 F. 55
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 229 U.S. 617 (1913) (affirming conviction of president and sole
stockholder of incorporated distillery despite forfeiture of distillery to government); State v.
McBride, 215 Minn. 123, 130, 9 N.W.2d 416, 420 (1943) (conviction of company president
for illegal sale of liquor by employee).
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Second, corporate employees may be accountable, under gen-
eral principles of accomplice liability, for crimes committed by
their cohorts and subordinates.9 Anyone who aids, counsels, com-
mands, encourages, or otherwise assists another to engage in con-
duct constituting an offense is liable for the crime in the same
manner as the actual perpetrator. 0
9. For an historical perspective on accomplice liability, see Brickey, supra note 7, at
415-21.
10. One who aids and abets a crime is one who assists in its perpetration. Accomplice
liability therefore requires a showing of some affirmative participation that at least consti-
tutes encouragement of the perpetrator. See, e.g., Dukich v. United States, 296 F. 691 (9th
Cir. 1924) (proprietor present at time of unlawful sale of alcoholic beverages and nodded to
bartender).
The character of the participation, however, need not qualify as perpetration of an ele-
ment of the substantive offense. Instructing another to commit an offense is a sufficient
basis for imposing liability, see, e.g., United States v. Berger, 456 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 892 (1972) (upholding conviction of president and chief executive officer of
corporation who instructed bookkeeper to remove invoices of foreign subsidiary-which en-
joyed favorable tax position-to enable corporation to pay same thereby reducing its income
and increasing that of subsidiary, for willful evasion of corporate income tax); Meredith v.
United States, 238 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1956) (upholding conviction of bank employee who
instructed subordinates to make false entries in bank records), as is authorizing another to
commit the offense, see, e.g., United States v. Precision Medical Laboratories, Inc., 593
F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1978) (owner knowingly authorized employees to sign false medicaid and
medicare claims); Kinnebrew v. State, 80 Ga. 232, 5 S.E. 56 (1887) (general authority from
employer to his clerk to make unlawful sales of alcoholic beverages sufficient to impose lia-
bility on employer for any single sale). Procuring neglect of an affirmative duty also may
provide a basis for imposing liability. See, e.g., United States v. Van Schaick, 134 F. 592
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904) (corporate officers and fleet commodore procuring corporation and
master to provide bad life preservers when good ones were required).
Mere presence at the scene of the crime, association with the perpetrator, and knowl-
edge of illegal activity, on the other hand, are insufficient standing alone, as would be mere
approval or acquiescence without expressed concurrence or other contribution to the of-
fense. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 469 F.2d 145 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 957 (1973); United States v. Joiner, 429 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1970). But cf. United States
v. Andreadis, 366 F.2d 423 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967) (upholding
conviction of corporate president who reviewed and approved advertising campaign that
included false claims though he did not specifically authorize the making of false claims). To
be liable for aiding and abetting one must associate himself with the venture, participate in
it as something he wishes to bring about, and through his action seek to make it succeed.
Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949); United States v. Pellegrino, 470
F.2d 1205, 1209 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 918 (1973); United States v. Peoni, 100
F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938). The aider and abettor must share the principal's criminal pur-
pose, even though he need not know every detail of the substantive offense. It is unneces-
sary for the aider and abettor to have knowledge of the illegality of the conduct, but he
must know that the forbidden activity is occurring and must intend to assist the perpetra-
tor. See, e.g., United States v. Amrep Corp., 560 F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v.
Schilleci, 545 F.2d 519 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978); United States v.
McDaniel, 545 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1976).
Exceptional cases exist, however, in which passive acquiescence or uncommunicated as-
sent to an unlawful course of conduct may warrant a finding of encouragement of the con-
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Last, criminal responsibility may derive from failure to control
corporate misconduct. One who has control over activities that
lead to a subordinate's violation of a statute may incur liability for
failure to fulfill the duty, commensurate with his position of au-
thority in the corporate hierarchy, to prevent or correct such
violations.11
The questions whether and when a corporate officer will be
duct by implication. In most of these cases there exists a special relation between the direct
actor and the silent approver, such as that of employer and employee, that vests in one the
right to control the conduct of the other. See, e.g., Moreland v. State, 164 Ga. 467, 139 S.E.
77 (1927) (owner-occupant of automobile, who failed to prevent chauffeur from driving at
excessive rate of speed during a rainstorm, liable for involuntary manslaughter of occupant
of vehicle with which owner's collided); accord, Story v. United States, 16 F.2d 342 (D.C.
Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 739 (1927); Ex parte Liotard, 47 Nev. 169, 217 P. 260
(1923).
In a corporate setting an officer, manager, or supervisor might similarly be held crimi-
nally responsible for conduct of a subordinate that was known to him and that he did not
attempt to halt. The agent's misconduct might consist of making a sale, accepting deposits,
or other acts that constitute elements of his daily routine. See, e.g., Morgan v. United
States, 149 F.2d 185 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 731 (1945) (selling ice at prices exceed-
ing the maximum allowed under Emergency Price Control Act of 1942); Carr v. State, 104
Ala. 4, 16 So. 150 (1894) (manager who knew bank was insolvent guilty even though he was
not present and did not authorize receipt of particular deposits, and though teller had no
guilty knowledge); Kinnebrew v. State, 80 Ga. 232, 5 S.E. 56 (1887) (unlawful sale of alco-
holic beverages); State v. Cramer, 20 Idaho 639, 119 P. 30 (1911) (vice president and general
manager of bank, knowing bank to be insolvent, permitted or consented to cashier continu-
ing to receive deposits); Commonwealth v. Nichols, 51 Mass. 259 (1845) (unlawful sale of
alcoholic beverages); State v. Mueller, 38 Minn. 497, 38 N.W. 691 (1888) (unlawful sale of
alcoholic beverages); State v. Wiggin, 20 N.H. 449 (1846) (unlawful sale of alcoholic bever-
ages). Assent to specific wrongful acts may be inferred from conferment of general authority
to engage in that type of conduct. See, e.g., Kinnebrew v. State, 80 Ga. 232, 5 S.E. 56 (1887)
(general authority from employer to his clerk to make unlawful sales of alcoholic beverages
sufficient to impose liability on employer for any single sale). Presence during the commis-
sion of the acts unaccompanied by any expression of objection to them may also support a
finding of assent to specific wrongful acts, see, e.g., State v. Mueller, 38 Minn. 497, 38 N.W.
691 (1888) (proprietor on premises and generally supervising some activity when alcoholic
beverages sold to minors), as may knowingly permitting continuation of the wrongful act,
see, e.g., Carr v. State, 104 Ala. 4, 16 So. 150 (1894) (permitting subordinate to continue
accepting deposits in insolvent bank); State v. Cramer, 20 Idaho 639, 119 P. 30 (1911) (per-
mitting subordinate to continue accepting deposits in insolvent bank); State v. Crawford,
151 Mo. App. 402, 132 S.W. 43 (1910) (proof of druggist's knowledge that employee permit-
ted drinking on premises sufficient in absence of evidence it was without consent).
Glanville Williams has also suggested that one may incur criminal liability for procuring
a crime by implication, as when an employer requires a driver to meet a time schedule that
can only be kept if the driver exceeds the lawful speed limit. G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW:
THE GENERAL PART § 123, at 363 (2d ed. 1961); see, e.g., Newman v. Overington, Harris and
Ash, Ltd., 93 J.P. 46 (K.B. 1928) (owners of motor coach, which was restricted by law to
maximum speed of 12 m.p.h., who advertised departure and arrival times necessitating aver-
age speed of 18 m.p.h. without allowing for stops or posted limits, liable as aiders and abet-
tors to driver's operation of coach at 35 m.p.h.).
11. This category of liability is the subject of this Article.
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personally responsible if a subordinate violates a penal statute
gained importance with the rise of the public welfare offense. Stat-
utes defining such offenses typically require neither intent nor
guilty knowledge; instead they simply penalize proscribed conduct
or results without regard to mens rea.1 Strict liability is imposed
because the conduct constituting the violation exposes the public
to an unacceptable risk of injury that is unaffected by the intent of
the violator.'
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act14 fits the public welfare of-
fense pattern, and prosecutions thereunder have served as the
principal vehicles for exploring the potential liability of a corporate
officer for violations in which he played no direct role. Prosecu-
tions under the Act are particularly appealing vehicles for analysis
because the Supreme Court in United States v. Dotterweich15 and
United States v. Park" upheld convictions of corporate officers
who did not personally participate in the conduct constituting the
violation. In neither case, however, did the Court clearly articulate
a bright line standard of liability under the Act. Despite the ab-
sence of an express statutory mens rea requirement, the Court de-
clined to state expressly that liability under the Act is strict liabil-
ity. But the Court also failed to specify that it was adopting a
standard requiring a culpable mental state. Instead, the Court in
both instances utilized a "responsible share" standard to deter-
mine whether the corporate officer stood in such a relation to the
12. This pattern of liability has its historical antecedents. See, e.g., State v. Burnam,
71 Wash. 199, 202, 128 P. 218, 219 (1912) (vicarious liability should be extended to manag-
ing agents "when the offense consists in the violation of a police regulation when neither a
guilty knowledge nor a criminal intent is made an element of the offense") (conviction re-
versed on other grounds); see also Brickey, supra note 7, at 418-21; cf. People v. Detroit
White Lead Works, 82 Mich. 471, 479, 46 N.W. 735, 737 (1890) (upholding nuisance convic-
tions of president, vice president, treasurer and manager who, as officers and directors of the
corporation, "are the persons primarily responsible").
13. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952). Individuals who may be
prosecuted under statutes defining public welfare offenses usually are capable of preventing
a violation by exercising the degree of diligence that those who seek positions of responsibil-
ity may reasonably be expected to exercise. Id.; see Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa.
575, 155 A.2d 825 (1959).
Although strict liability is imposed because of the risk to the public and not because the
offense is malum prohibitum, Morrisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 259-60 (1952), some
courts have stressed the distinction between malurn in se and malum prohibitum offenses
as partial justification for imposing strict liability. See, e.g., United States v. United States
Steel Corp., 328 F. Supp. 354, 356 (N.D. Ind. 1970), aff'd, 482 F.2d 439 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 909 (1973) (construing the Refuse Act of 1899).
14. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1976).
15. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
16. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
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offending transaction that he could be held criminally accountable
under the Act.1
Professor Norman Abrams in a recent article on Dotterweich
and Park'8 has suggested that the language the Court used in the
opinions is sufficiently ambiguous that it is susceptible of at least
two disparate interpretations. The first is what he characterizes as
a "corporate responsibility view," 19 under which one may read the
opinions as adopting a rather rigid standard that holds a corporate
officer strictly liable for violations occurring in connection with a
transaction over which he had at least a minimal measure of con-
trol.20 The second interpretation that Abrams finds plausible is
what he calls a "negligence view" of the cases, under which a
more liberal reading of the Court's language would hold a corpo-
rate officer liable only when the facts support a finding of "a de-
parture from a standard of care.122
His brief analysis of two subsequent Ninth Circuit decisions
upholding convictions of corporate officers28 leads Abrams to con-
clude that while the language of the two opinions suggests that the
court applied a standard of care test of liability 4 and thereby re-
jected "the idea" of a strict liability standard,6 the results in the
two cases are more consistent with a corporate responsibility stan-
17. Park, 421 U.S. at 673-75; Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284.
18. Abrams, Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers for Strict Liability Offenses-A
Comment on Dotterweich and Park, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 463 (1981).
19. Id. at 469.
20. Id. at 475.
21. Id. at 469.
22. Id. While recognizing that Dotterweich and Park articulate a standard of individ-
ual liability for corporate officers and employees, Abrams briefly considers the application of
the responsible share standard to the corporation under both a corporate responsibility view
and a standard of care view of the cases. Id. at 472-73. This brief digression from his thesis
is prompted by two judicial decisions that cite Dotterweich and Park even though corporate
defendants were involved. See United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 906 (2d Cir. 1978)
(citing Dotterweich and Park as authority for proposition that omission to perform a duty,
in addition to performing an affirmative act, may be basis of corporation's liability under
Migratory Bird Treaty Act); United States v. Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 461 F. Supp.
760, 764 (N.D.N.Y. 1978) (citing Dotterweich and Park as authority for proposition that the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act imposes a standard of absolute liability). Inasmuch as neither
case purports to apply the responsible share standard to a corporate defendant, this Article
omits any discussion of that portion of Professor Abrams' article and considers exclusively
the standard of liability imposed upon corporate officers and employees.
23. United States v. Y. Hata & Co., 535 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Starr, 535 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1976).
24. Abrams, supra note 18, at 470-72.
25. Id. at 476.
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dard.2 6 One senses that he finds those results profoundly
unsatisfactory. 7
Professor Abrams finds a requirement of culpability more de-
sirable than a strict liability standard, 8 and he postulates that the
negligence view of Dotterweich and Park is more likely to prevail.29
Suggesting that courts are fundamentally uncomfortable with the
notion of strict criminal liability," he maintains that judges have
therefore historically engaged in a process of "reinterpreting and
modifying a strict liability approach""1 to avoid unfairness. While
faulting the Supreme Court for its inability or unwillingness "to
develop a doctrinal modification of strict liability for corporate of-
ficers in unambiguous terms that avoids introducing confusion and
uncertainty into the law,"32 he finds that the Court's decisions
under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act have at least the merit of
laying a foundation that enables courts to avoid applying a strict
liability standard without expressly stating a culpability require-
ment.33 Abrams suggests that with such a foundation in place, it is
but a short step to direct or indirect adoption of a requirement of
culpability,3 4 and he cites introduction of such devices as the "vol-
untary act and causation concepts" as examples of indirect meth-
ods of arriving at a culpability requirement.3 5
This Article offers an alternative analysis of the doctrine ar-
ticulated by the Supreme Court in Dotterweich and Park and its
subsequent application by the Ninth Circuit. In the course of so
doing, it suggests that Professor Abrams has lost sight of the pub-
lic welfare offense model that provided the analytical framework
within which the cases were decided and that his postulates may
thus be faulted as lacking in context. The analysis in this Article
demonstrates that the responsible share standard of liability has,
from the outset, incorporated the requirement of an act or omis-
sion to act and that of causation as well, and that these two ele-
26. Id. at 472.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 146-48 & 156-57.
28. Abrams, supra note 18, at 476-77.
29. Id. at 469, 475.
30. "We tend to resist the idea of strict criminal liability, and our resistance often
takes the form of reinterpreting the applicable doctrine to introduce a limited measure of
culpability." Id. at 475.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 476.




ments of liability, when considered together with administrative
enforcement policy, should assuage apprehension regarding the
possible unfairness of holding corporate officers strictly liable for
violations of the Act. This Article also suggests that the food and
drug cases have important implications regarding the system of
delegation upon which corporate officers find it essential to rely.
II. United States v. Dotterweich
The first significant decision under the Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act was United States v. Dotterweich." In Dotterweich a
closely divided Supreme Court37 upheld the conviction of the pres-
ident and general manager of the Buffalo Pharmacal Company.
Both Dotterweich and Buffalo Pharmacal had been indicted for
shipping adulterated and misbranded drugs in interstate com-
merce.3 8 The Government neither claimed nor proved that Dot-
terweich had possessed any knowledge of the facts that constituted
the violation, nor did it claim that he had actively participated in
the distribution of the offending articles. Instead, Dotterweich's
conviction seemed to rest on his position of authority within the
corporation.
Writing for a majority of the Court, Justice Frankfurter noted
that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act puts a seller of goods at
risk to know the properties of the commodity he distributes
through the channels of commerce. The Act's regulatory scheme
dispenses with "the conventional requirement for criminal con-
duct-awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interests of the larger
good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person other-
wise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public
danger." 89
The test the Court adopted for ascertaining the existence of
personal guilt is whether the individual officer or agent "shares re-
sponsibility in the business process"' 0 that results in introduction
of adulterated drugs in commerce. "The offense is committed...
36. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
37. Chief Justice Stone and Justices Black, Douglas, and Jackson joined Justice
Frankfurter's majority opinion. Justice Murphy wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices
Roberts, Reed, and Rutledge joined.
38. Dotterweich was convicted, the corporation acquitted. 320 U.S. at 278.
39. Id. at 281. The Court rejected the proposition that a nonparticipating officer must
use the corporation as his alter ego before he is liable under the Act. Id. at 282. If it were
otherwise, the corporate fine might simply serve as an institutional cost of conducting busi-
ness in an illegitimate manner. But see supra note 38.
40. 320 U.S. at 284.
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by all who do have such a responsible share in the furtherance of
the transaction which the statute outlaws .. ..",1
While cognizant of the potential hardship that might result
from imposing liability on corporate officers absent a statutory re-
quirement of intent or knowledge, the Court concluded that Con-
gress had weighed that hardship against the hazard to the public if
the rule were otherwise. As between the two, corporate agents
"have at least the opportunity of informing themselves of the exis-
tence of conditions imposed for the protection of consumers before
sharing in illicit commerce . . . .4 Consumers, on the other hand,
are "wholly helpless" to do so."
Although Dotterweich made clear that corporate officers may
be criminally accountable for violations of a penal statute contain-
ing no express requirement of a culpable mental state provided
that they share responsibility in the business process that results
in the offense, the opinion of the Court left doubt about the con-
tours of this doctrine."
The opinion in Dotterweich did not resolve, for instance, the
importance of the officer's personal role in the operation of the
company. Defendant Dotterweich was president and manager of a
relatively small company, and he exercised supervision over its day
to day operations.45 Would he have had a responsible share in the
offending transaction if he had not personally supervised any of
the operations, or if he had presided over a large conglomerate?
The question of the degree of involvement required to hold an of-
ficer personally accountable for a criminal violation remained un-
answered. The opinion also neglected to address the related issue
of what class or classes of employees might have had a responsible
share in the unlawful transaction. The opinion left us to wonder
whether all supervisory personnel would fit within the class of lia-
ble agents and, indeed, whether low level employees who inno-
cently implemented Dotterweich's instructions to fill a drug order
would have shared responsibility in the business process resulting
in the violation.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 285.
43. Id.
44. See generally O'Keefe & Shapiro, Personal Criminal Liability Under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act-The Dotterweich Doctrine, 30 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 5
(1975).
45. Brief for the Respondent at 10, 11, United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277
(1943) [hereinafter cited as Brief for the Respondent].
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Surely Frankfurter entertained some of these questions in his
own mind, for in the last paragraph of his opinion he pointedly
declined to address them.
It would be too treacherous to define or even to indicate by way of illustra-
tion the class of employees which stands in such a responsible relation. To
attempt a formula embracing the variety of conduct whereby persons may
responsibly contribute in furthering a transaction forbidden by an Act of
Congress... would be mischievous futility. In such matters the good sense
of prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial judges, and the ultimate judgment
of juries must be trusted.4"
Although Professor Abrams finds that Justice Frankfurter's
opinion reasonably may be interpreted either to impose strict lia-
bility or to adopt a poorly articulated standard of culpability, he
asserts that the most commonly accepted view of Dotterweich is
that the Court "established strict, vicarious liability for corporate
executives.' 7 While that may be the prevailing view, its formula-
tion should not be accepted uncritically. Assuming for the moment
that the Court did indeed adopt a strict liability standard, Justice
Frankfurter's opinion failed to resolve the question whether liabil-
ity was vicarious or personal. The point is of some doctrinal signifi-
cance,48 and the opinion of the Court may be faulted for neglecting
to remark upon it. 4"
The Court's opinion left in doubt whether Dotterweich was li-
able because culpable acts of the underling who actually shipped
the drugs were imputable to him, or whether he was liable because
his own inaction to prevent the violation constituted a punishable
omission to perform a positive duty imposed by law. Though tech-
nical, the question is far from academic.
The Buffalo Pharmacal Company was a drug jobber. The com-
pany filled mail orders with drugs that it had purchased from
wholesalers and then repackaged and relabeled under the Buffalo
46. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285.
47. Abrams, supra note 18, at 464 (emphasis added).
48. Apart from the doctrinal significance discussed in the text, whether vicarious lia-
bility is necessarily strict is a point on which there may be some disagreement. Compare W.
LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, HANDBOOK ON CRmINAL LAW § 32 (1972) with Miller, A Primer of
Absolute Liability, 1957 WASH. U.L.Q. 99.
49. Justice Murphy's dissent in Dotterweich contended that the majority had treated
this as a case of vicarious liability. He viewed as unjust the imputation of criminal guilt to
an individual for "an act in which the accused did not participate and of which he had no
personal knowledge" absent a clear congressional directive. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 286. To
hold Dotterweich accountable to the corporation and its stockholders "for negligence and
mismanagement" would be more appropriate than to hold him responsible for a criminal
violation of the Act. Id.
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Pharmacal name." If the theoretical basis of Dotterweich's liabil-
ity was that of vicarious liability, then the focal point of the in-
quiry should be the agents whose conduct actually resulted in the
introduction of adulterated and mislabeled drugs into commerce.
It would be necessary to find that the employees who packaged,
labeled, and shipped the drugs either personally committed a crim-
inal violation of the statute or caused the corporation to do so. If
they did neither, then there would be no crime to impute to Dot-
terweich. This theory of liability might plausibly follow from
Frankfurter's opinion, which explicitly recognized that introduc-
tion of adulterated drugs "must be accomplished, and may be fur-
thered by persons standing in various relations to the incorporeal
proprietor" '51 without regard for intent or guilty knowledge.
It is equally plausible that the Court predicated Dotterweich's
liability on his own omission to perform some affirmative duty im-
posed by law and that his liability for the violation was therefore
personal. If that were the case, the focus of the inquiry necessarily
would change. Since Dotterweich's liability under this theory
would rest on his own inaction, the employees who engaged in the
conduct constituting the violation might or might not be criminally
responsible for their participation in the transaction, depending on
whether the Act also imposed a corresponding duty on them. The
inquiry relevant to Dotterweich's liability would consist of ascer-
taining the precise nature and exact scope of the legal duty im-
posed, including a determination of whether the duty to prevent
the violation was absolute or qualified.
Professor Abrams obliquely approaches the latter point by ex-
plaining that under a common view the strict liability doctrine is
made more palatable by an underlying assumption that "some
minimally culpable action or inaction ' 52 at least amounting to neg-
ligence is present whenever a violation occurs.53 Under this expla-
nation, he maintains, the doctrine of strict liability is not as much
concerned with abrogation of a culpability requirement as it is con-
cerned with relieving the prosecution of the burden of producing
affirmative proof of culpability." "If one accepts this perception of
50. United States v. Buffalo Pharmacal Co., 131 F.2d 500, 501 (2d Cir. 1942), rev'd sub
nom. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
51. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 283.
52. Abrams, supra note 18, at 465.
53. Id. at 465-66.
54. "Under this view, strict liability does not dispense with a culpability approach so
much as it frees the prosecutor from having to prove culpability in the particular case." Id.
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strict liability, then the idea of a responsible share requirement
seems naturally to follow." 55 Furthermore, Abrams suggests, the
concept of responsibility connotes some measure of culpability."
While proof that a corporate officer had some control over the
troublesome business process would not necessarily prove that he
was negligent, the underlying assumption of minimally culpable
conduct "makes one more comfortable with the imposition of crim-
inal liability even though negligence has not been proved in the
particular case."'57 Thus, even if the responsible share standard was
from the outset one of strict liability, one might find reassuring a
presumably warranted assumption of some unspecified variety of
culpability.
Alternatively, Professor Abrams finds some grounds for con-
cluding that the Dotterweich opinion left room for later explicit
imposition of a culpability requirement." While Justice Frank-
furter declined to define a standard of culpability," one might read
his opinion as merely eliminating conscious fraud and conscious
wrongdoing as required culpable mental states, but leaving open
the possibility of requiring some other state of mind such as negli-
gence.60 Indeed, Abrams suggests, language in the Government's
brief which the Court might have construed as an argument that
at 466 (emphasis in original).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 465.
57. Id. at 466.
58. Id. at 464,466. Indeed, Abrams observes, one might argue that Justice Frankfurter
adopted a culpability requirement inasmuch as his opinion incorporated "language and con-
cepts that implied such a requirement." Id. at 465. The opinion noted that distribution of
adulterated or misbranded drugs may be attributed to the activities of numerous individuals
holding different positions and possessing varying degrees of authority within the corpora-
tion. Frankfurter wrote that "[t]o speak with technical accuracy, under § 301 a corporation
may commit an offense and all persons who aid and abet its commission are equally guilty."
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284. Citing Johnson v. Youden [1950] 1 K.B. 544, Professor
Abrams notes that characterization of corporate employees as aiders and abettors is consis-
tent with a requirement of a culpable mental state. Abrams, supra note 18, at 465. See also
W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 48, at 512 (liability without fault inconsistent with ac-
complice liability); G. WLIAMS, supra note 10, at 395 (liability of secondary parties subject
to common-law requirement of mens rea).
59. Abrams, supra note 18, at 466.
60. Id. The late Herbert Packer's reading of this part of Frankfurter's opinion
presents an interesting contrast. After quoting at length from the opinion of the Court,
Packer complained that Justice Frankfurter had forwarded a "primitive and rigid view of
mens rea." H. PACKER, THE LIMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 125 (1968). According to
Packer, the Court seemed to have said that "'[c]onscious fraud' and 'awareness of some
wrongdoing' are impossibly high standards. . .and that leaves only strict liability." Id.
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Dotterweich was negligent 1 "may have influenced the Court's re-
sponse" to Dotterweich's claim that he was not a person liable
under the Act.62
While detailed analysis of the Court's language is essential to
the process of making judgments about the policy and content of
the standard of liability adopted, an additional dimension is added
when that language is considered in the context of the specific vio-
lations with which Dotterweich and the corporation were charged.
The first violation consisted of interstate shipment of mis-
branded cascara compound."s Buffalo Pharmacal had purchased
the compound from a wholesaler and repackaged and relabeled it
under the Buffalo Pharmacal name. The Buffalo Pharmacal labels
that the company affixed to the cascara packages specified that the
drug supplied was cascara compound prepared according to the
Hinkle formula and that it contained, among other ingredients,
strychnine sulphate.6 ' While the Hinkle formula had at one time
61. Abrams quotes from the Government's brief a passage in which the Government
noted that defendants had produced no evidence that the corporation had tested the po-
tency of the drugs before reselling them and that Dotterweich alone "had the... opportu-
nity to provide for such a test and he failed to do it. .. ." Abrams, supra note 18, at 466
(quoting Brief for the United States at 20, n.14, United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277
(1943)). Abrams unpersuasively asserts that the change in the focus of the argument in this
passage from that of identifying Dotterweich as a responsible person possessing control over
the troublesome business process to that of Dotterweich's failure to seize the opportunity to
test the drugs, "amounted to explicitly attributing negligent inaction" to him. Id. (emphasis
added). It would seem, however, that the Government was merely noting that an omission to
perform a duty that it was possible to fulfill could support a conviction under the Act. This
argument presaged the Court's later injection of the so-called "objective impossibility" de-
fense in United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975). See infra text accompanying notes 108-
66. Abrams seems closer to the mark when he admits that the shift in emphasis in the
footnote passage is "slight." Abrams, supra note 18, at 466.
62. Abrams, supra note 18, at 466-67.
63. United States v. Buffalo Pharmacal Co., 131 F.2d 500, 501 (2d Cir. 1942), rev'd sub
nom. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).








C ascarin .... ........ ................................................... 1/4 gr.
A loin ... ............ ................................................... 1/4 gr.
Podophyllia ... ........ ................................................. 1/6 gr.
Ext. Belladonna ......................................................... 1/8 gr.
Strychnine Sulphate .................................................... 1/60 gr.
Oleo. G inger ........................................................... 1/16 gr.
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included strychnine sulphate, that ingredient was removed from
the National Formulary before the offending shipment occurred.65
Thus, the label would be false or misleading "in that it would lead
the purchaser or the public to believe that the tablets contained
only the ingredients designated in the official formula for Hinkle
pills"6 while in fact the compound contained the additional listed,
but unauthorized, strychnine ingredient.6 7
The second violation consisted of interstate shipment of digi-
talis tablets that were less than half the potency represented on
the label.6 8 Buffalo Pharmacal also had purchased these tablets
from another pharmaceutical supplier and repackaged them under
the Buffalo Pharmacal label. Although the issue of fact was dis-
puted, 9 the jury found that the dilution in potency occurred some-
time prior to the time when Buffalo Pharmacal reshipped the
drug." Moreover, the discrepancy in the represented and actual
strength of the medication would not have been immediately ap-
parent to anyone at Buffalo Pharmacal,71 and detection of the
problem probably would have required chemical analysis of sam-
ples of the shipment.2
Arguments on behalf of Dotterweich with respect to the mis-
branded cascara violation lack strong appeal under either a strict
liability or a culpability standard. A uniform standard for the con-
tent of a compound bearing the name of an officially approved
formula binds drug manufacturers and suppliers alike. 3 Just as a
duty is imposed upon the manufacturer to change its formula for
any compound when the standard for that drug is changed, a cor-
responding duty is imposed upon the jobber to discard old labels
and print new ones that are technically and factually accurate.
Record at 4-5, United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) (Information No. 2104C)
[hereinafter cited as Record].
65. United States v. Buffalo Pharmacal Co., 131 F.2d 500, 501 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1942),
rev'd sub nom. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
66. Buffalo Pharmacal Co., 131 F.2d at 501-02.
67. Record, supra note 64, at 4-5 (Information No. 2104C), 41 (testimony of Solomon
M. Berman).
68. United States v. Buffalo Pharmacal Co., 131 F.2d 500, 502 (2d Cir. 1942), rev'd sub
noma. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
69. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 45, at 21-25.
70. United States v. Buffalo Pharmacal Co., 131 F.2d 500, 501 (2d Cir. 1942), reu'd sub
noma. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
71. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 45, at 18-19.
72. Id.
73. For an explanation of the respective roles of the National Formulary and the
Pharmacopeia at that time, see Record, supra note 64, at 71-77.
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While the manufacturer and the jobber might have been free to
sell a cascara compound containing strychnine sulphate as some-
thing other than Hinkle pills, 4 they were required to discontinue
selling the drug under that particular designation once the stan-
dard was changed.
Dotterweich was active in managing the day to day operations
of the company, and only he had real authority to direct and su-
pervise those operations. 75 The responsibility for implementing
measures to ensure that labels bearing the Buffalo Pharmacal
name did not misrepresent the identity of the compound bearing
those labels reposed in Dotterweich. He did not claim that he had
even attempted to discharge that duty. Whether his default was
the product of a culpable economic decision to use all of the old
labels or merely resulted from an unawareness of the change in the
National Formulary should make no difference. A claimed lack of
intent to defraud or unawareness of a published change in the Na-
tional Formulary surely would not have exonerated the chief chem-
ist of the drug manufacturer had he continued to produce the old
compound as Hinkle pills, and there is no apparent reason why
such a claim should affect the liability of the president and general
manager of a small drug supplier such as Buffalo Pharmacal. That
is especially true in a case such as Dotterweich in which there is
not a shred of evidence that some corporate mechanism equipped
to handle routinely so basic a responsibility as the accurate label-
ing of its products even existed.
The argument favoring a culpability requirement with respect
to the digitalis violation has, at least facially, somewhat greater ap-
peal than it has in the context of the cascara violation. Assume, for
example, that Buffalo Pharmacal had ordered digitalis tablets with
a potency of three grains, but that, unbeknownst to any of its em-
ployees, tablets with a potency of only one and one-half grains
were supplied. Since the problem originated at the manufacturer's
plant and the discrepancy was not readily ascertainable, one might
argue that to hold Dotterweich criminally liable for reselling them
as three grain tablets is unfair.
Perhaps the Court anticipated this argument, for in holding
that Dotterweich could be held criminally liable for shipping the
adulterated and misbranded digitalis even absent proof of con-
74. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 45, at 6.




scious fraud, Justice Frankfurter stated that "[iut was natural
enough to throw this risk on shippers with regard to the identity of
their wares. '78 This hardly seems a radical requirement. If a seller
of goods who has a direct economic interest in placing his own la-
bel upon the goods he sells is not at risk to know the character and
properties of that which he labels as his own, pray tell who is?77
And who should be?
Suppose, however, that Buffalo Pharmacal was not equipped
to perform the chemical analysis required to determine whether
the digitalis it received from the manufacturer was actually the de-
sired potency. Apart from considerations of the fairness of impos-
ing strict liability under such circumstances, this factual modifica-
tion raises the question whether the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
implicitly requires independent chemical analysis before one may
resell a drug without incurring the risk of criminal liability. The
answer would seem to be a qualified no.
The answer would be no, because the statute provides that no
person shall be subject to criminal penalties under section 333 of
the Act "if he establishes a guaranty or undertaking signed by, and
containing the name and address of, the person.., from whom he
received in good faith the article, to the effect ... that such article
is not adulterated or misbranded. 7 8 Thus, if the Buffalo Pharma-
cal Company had obtained a guaranty from its supplier, the com-
pany and its executive would not have borne the risk of liability
76. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488,497-
98 (1911)).

















Record, supra note 64, at 8-9 (Information No. 2190C).
78. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 303(c), 21 U.S.C. § 333(c) (1976).
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for introducing into interstate commerce a drug considered
adulterated or misbranded under the Act because the label mis-
presented the drug's potency.79
79. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals had reversed Dotterweich's conviction
largely on the basis of the guaranty provision. Buffalo Pharmacal Co., 131 F.2d at 503. The
court was concerned that the language of this provision seemed not to extend its protection
to innocent agents who unwittingly take part in interstate shipment of adulterated drugs.
The proprietor rather than the agent is the person likely to obtain the guaranty, and the
agent thus would have no control over the dealer's decision to obtain or to forgo that protec-
tion. Moreover, the agent would be unlikely to be the party who "received" the article from
the guarantor. Id.
The court found it inconceivable that Congress would expect "anyone except the princi-
pal to get such a guaranty, or to make the guilt of an agent depend upon whether his em-
ployer had gotten one." Id. The court, therefore, concluded that the statute must mean that
only a proprietor, either a corporation or an individual, "causes" the unlawful introduction
of drugs into commerce for purposes of the penal provisions. In this case no evidence existed
to show that Dotterweich had set up a sham corporation to use as his agent and that he was,
therefore, the principal at whom the statutory injunction was directed. Instead, the Buffalo
Pharmacal Company-a legitimate business entity-was the object of the regulation. Id.
The Supreme Court found the court of appeals' reading of the guaranty provision to be
so restrictive that it "cut down the scope of the penalizing provisions of the Act" contrary to
congressional intent to stiffen penalties for criminal violations. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280.
The Court concluded:
The Act is concerned not with the proprietory relation to a misbranded or an adulter-
ated drug but with its distribution. In the case of a corporation such distribution must
be accomplished, and may be furthered, by persons standing in various relations to the
incorporeal proprietor. If a guaranty immunizes shipments of course it immunizes all
involved in the shipment. But simply because if there had been a guaranty it would
have been received by the proprietor, whether corporate or individual, as a safeguard
for the enterprise, the want of a guaranty does not cut down the scope of responsibility
of all who are concerned with transactions forbidden by § 301.
Id. at 283-84.
The Court recognized that its adoption of this view left open the possibility that all who
participate in the introduction of adulterated or misbranded products, and who are there-
fore "responsible," may incur liability simply because the proprietor neglected to obtain a
guaranty. Id. at 284. The Court believed, nonetheless, that the appellate court had read the
provision in a vacuum and thus had effectively neutralized the penalty section. Id. at 280,
284.
The Government also seemed to be aware of the potential for abuse if the Court were to
construe the Act in accordance with the Government's view. Its brief therefore specifically
addressed this issue by noting that Food and Drug Administration policy had been "to
avoid prosecution of underlings acting under instructions." Brief for the Government at 32,
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943). The Government observed that the in-
stant case illustrated well the operation of the agency's policy, for the employees who had
actually bottled, labeled, and shipped the drugs in question were not prosecuted. Id. n.24.
Of 204 criminal prosecutions involving corporate defendants in 1942, about 30% had also
involved individual defendants. The Government noted that the individual defendants had
been persons who, like Dotterweich, were at the policy-making level of the corporate hierar-
chy or who had some discretionary functions and were "above the level of mere hired hands
following instructions." Id. at 32-33.
The Government cautioned, however, that the Act should not be construed to eliminate
the possibility of prosecuting those who are mere clerks, inasmuch as it would be "incon-
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The answer would be qualified, however, because one forgoes
the protection afforded by a guaranty at his peril. Without the
guaranty he must either run an independent analysis or run the
risk of incurring criminal liability if he inadvertently misrepresents
what he sells.
Justice Frankfurter suggested why such an interpretation of
the Act would be consistent with congressional purpose. In the
course of concluding that shippers ought to be required to assume
responsibility for knowing what they sell, Frankfurter's opinion
noted that penal legislation that dispenses with the traditional re-
quirement of culpability "puts the burden of acting at hazard upon
a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to
a public danger."80 This passage vividly recalls to mind the func-
tion of legislation defining public welfare offenses. Public welfare
legislation utilizes criminal sanctions to regulate conduct that
poses an unacceptably high risk of danger to the public at large.
Viewing the digitalis violation charged in Dotterweich within
this framework, then, one might reasonably inquire how important
it is that a prescribing physician be in a position to know the po-
tency of the medication he prescribes81 and what consequences
would follow ingestion of an improper dosage of digitalis. In the
case at hand the dosage was only half as strong as expected. A
heart patient might suffer no untoward consequences from the
drug itself under these circumstances, but the result desired by the
prescribing physician might not be achieved.82 If the disparity had
been the opposite and the digitalis tablets were actually twice as
potent, the medication could cause the patient to become ill.83
Imposing on a drug jobber an obligation either to perform a
chemical analysis to ascertain the properties of a drug or to obtain
a guaranty from the supplier serves to ensure that some party in
the distributive chain assumes responsibility for the contents of
ceivable that Congress intended to spare clerks who act with 'intent to defraud or mislead'
or who negligently and contrary to instructions act so as to cause a violation of the Act." Id.
at 33-34.
80. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281.
81. See Record, supra note 64, at 96 (testimony of Harold J. Tagett).
82. Id. at 102-05 (testimony of Herbert A. Braum (recalled)). A recent study of outpa-
tients with heart failure suggests that the desired result might not be achieved in any event,
notwithstanding administration of the proper dosage. See Lee, Johnson, Bingham, Leahy,
Dinsmore, Goroll, Newell, Strauss & Haber, Heart Failure in Outpatients: A Randomized
Trial of Digoxin Versus Placebo, 306 NEw ENG. J. MED. 699 (1982) (concluding that while
many heart patients respond to digitalis treatment, some may not benefit clinically from
administration of the drug).
83. See Record, supra note 64, at 102-05.
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the package labeled three grain digitalis tablets.8 ' A requirement of
an identifiable responsible party should in theory minimize the
risk that adulterated or misbranded drugs which pose a hazard to
the consumer will be marketed to an unsuspecting public.
Similarly, with respect to the cascara violation, even though
the label truthfully disclosed all of the ingredients contained in the
compound, the misleading designation of the drug as Hinkle pills
could bring about dire consequences. It is conceivable, for example,
that after strychnine sulphate was removed from the National For-
mulary a physician might have recommended Hinkle pills to a pa-
tient who was allergic to the strychnine that formerly had been an
approved component of the compound. If the patient ingested so-
called Hinkle pills distributed by the Buffalo Pharmacal Company,
the result could be disastrous.
Thus, even though the conduct that provided the basis of the
prosecution in Dotterweich might be consistent with a finding of
culpability-negligence, for instance-if one weighs the elementary
requirement that a seller of drugs know and correctly designate the
identity of his wares against the risk to public health if this re-
quirement is not fulfilled, this case poses a classic example of the
type of situation that prompts enactment of public welfare
offenses.
m. THE AFTERMATH OF Dotterweich
During the three decades following the Dotterweich decision
courts accomplished little in the way of clarifying ambiguities in
the responsible share test. Most reported decisions concerning
prosecutions of corporate officers were factually similar to Dot-
terweich,85 and courts routinely approved indictment and convic-
tion of officers who exercised continuing supervision over their
businesses.8 Although most successful prosecutions resulted only
84. See supra note 77.
85. Although most of the violations involved adulterated or misbranded drugs and
food, at least one court extended the principles of Dotterweich to a transaction violating the
cosmetics provisions of the Act in a prosecution naming only the corporate defendant. See
United States v. Parfait Powder Puff Co., 163 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 851 (1948) (upholding conviction of corporation for violation committed by indepen-
dent contractor).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Shapiro, 491 F.2d 335 (6th Cir. 1974) (upholding revoca-
tion of probation of convicted owner, president, and sales manager of cookie company);
United States v. H.B. Gregory Co., 502 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007
(1975) (upholding conviction of president and treasurer of bakery supply warehouse who
had personal responsibility for all operations); Lelles v. United States, 241 F.2d 21 (9th
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in imposition of a modest fine, jail sentences and terms of proba-
tion occasionally were imposed. 7
In addition to holding title to a relatively high office or pos-
sessing general authority over the business, the individuals who
were targets of Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act prosecutions usually
had a close relationship with the business operation resulting in
the violation. Because of that prosecutorial pattern, it appeared
that small businessmen were subject to "a particularly high risk
Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 974 (1957) (upholding conviction of owner of mushroom com-
pany); United States v. H. Wool & Sons, 215 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1954) (upholding conviction of
part owner and secretary of dairy products wholesale company who was active in the man-
agement of its affairs and was dominating factor in company); Golden Grain Macaroni Co. v.
United States, 209 F.2d 166 (9th Cir. 1953) (upholding conviction of president of company
who managed plant and indicating that physical presence of responsible officer when viola-
tion occurred was unnecessary); United States v. Kaadt, 171 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1948) (up-
holding convictions of operators of diabetic clinic under instruction that jury must consider
the work they performed, their duties and responsibilities, and extent to which they each
controlled business of clients); United States v. Diamond State Poultry Co., 125 F. Supp.
617 (D. Del. 1954) (upholding convictions of two major officers who made corporate policy
and were personally involved in operations of company). See also Kordell v. United States,
335 U.S. 345 (1948) (holding that pamphlets sent separately from drug shipment but to
same consignee constituted labeling, and that conviction of individual who wrote and
shipped them was proper, even though he may have believed pamphlets were permissible
advertising). For a discussion of the foregoing cases, see O'Keefe & Shapiro, supra note 44,
at 9-18.
Among these cases United States v. Shapiro, 491 F.2d 335 (6th Cir. 1974), is notable.
Shapiro was co-owner, president and sales manager of the Tasty Cookie Company. He and
his partner had been convicted of violating the Act, and following their convictions the
plant was shut down for clean-up operations. They subsequently reopened the plant, but
also decided to sell it. During negotiations with a prospective buyer the partners had some
disagreements, and Shapiro bought out his partner in order to complete the transaction.
The purchaser hired someone to take charge of production, and six days later they signed an
agreement giving the purchaser "operations and management" of the plant as of April 10.
On April 18 a stock purchase agreement was signed. The final closing date was set for April
27. An FDA inspector appeared at the plant April 23 and 24 and found unsanitary condi-
tions amounting to another violation of the Act.
Shapiro claimed that the signing of the agreement passed equitable title to the pur-
chaser and therefore absolved him of personal responsibility, for the violations. Rejecting
that argument, the Sixth Circuit noted that he remained president of the company and
owner of all the assets during that period, and he clearly possessed both "the power and the
authority to devise whatever measures were necessary to assure compliance with the FDA
regulations." Id. at 337. He had the options of closing the plant until the new owner could
assume complete control, requiring the purchaser to provide written assurances that the
purchaser would not distribute adulterated food products during the period in question, or
of cleaning up the plant himself. "It is clear that appellant failed to implement adequate
safeguards at any time." Id. His involvement in this unlawful enterprise violated the terms
of his probation under the prior conviction and constituted grounds for revoking it. Id. at
336.
87. See, e.g., United States v. Shapiro, 491 F.2d 335 (6th Cir. 1974) (revoking proba-




since they generally are involved in plant operations, in addition to
their overall responsibilities.""8 Subsequent developments, how-
ever, created good reason to reevaluate that perception.
In 1972 the General Accounting Office reported to Congress a
significant increase in sanitation problems in the food industry.8 "
The report prompted accelerated Food and Drug Administration
enforcement efforts, which included a communication to trade as-
sociations in the food industry warning that enforcement activity
would be stepped up.'0 Apparently regarding the response to the
warning as inadequate, FDA officials directed a subsequent com-
munication to the presidents of several food chains. This letter
contained the same warning, with the following additional
embellishment:
We regard you as the person who ultimately has the authority to order cor-
rection of such conditions, and thus who ultimately must bear the responsi-
bility for any failure to correct them. Should it become necessary to bring
criminal action to prevent a continuation of violative conditions, therefore,
we wish you to understand that you and the other high corporate officials in
your organization who are specifically responsible for sanitation practices will
be held accountable.'"
That action set the stage for a spate of criminal prosecutions
involving the food industry generally," and in particular for a
prosecution that would revive debate about the long-dormant re-
sponsible share test.
IV. United States v. Park
The vehicle for renewed consideration of the test was United
States v. Park.'8 Unlike Dotterweich and its progeny the Park
88. O'Keefe & Shapiro, supra note 44, at 20.
89. Id. at 29.
90. The letter was written by Sam Fine, FDA Associate Commissioner for compliance.
Id.
91. Id.
92. Over a five year period 81% of the 352 criminal prosecutions under the Act in-
volved the food industry. Id. These statistics, however, include prosecutions initiated in
years preceding the GAO Report and the increased FDA enforcement activity generated by
the report.
93. 421 U.S. 658 (1975). Justices Douglas, Brennan, White, Blackmun, and Rehnquistjoined Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion. Justice Stewart wrote a dissenting opinion in
which Justices Marshall and Powell joined. For commentaries on Park and its impact on the
liability of corporate officers, see O'Keefe & Isley, Dotterweich Revisited-Criminal Liabil-
ity Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 31 FooD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 69 (1976);
Rodwin, A Violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act-A Crime in Search of a
Criminal, 31 FoOD DRUG Cos,. L.J. 616 (1976); Sethi & Katz, The Expanding Scope of
Personal Criminal Liability of Corporate Executives-Some Implications of United States
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prosecution targeted a corporate executive who presided over a
large company with national operations. Park was president and
chief executive officer of Acme Markets, Inc., a national retail food
chain with 874 outlets, sixteen warehouses, and 36,000 employees.
Acme's headquarters and Park's office were located in Philadel-
phia; the violations in question occurred in the Baltimore
warehouse.
In 1970 the FDA advised Park in writing that inspection of
the Philadelphia warehouse revealed sanitation problems. In 1971
the FDA sent a second communication to Park indicating that sim-
ilar problems existed in the Baltimore warehouse. Characterizing
the conditions in Baltimore as "reprehensible," the FDA concluded
that they either had existed over a "prolonged period of time with-
out any detection" or else had been "completely ignored."94 The
letter characterized the need for additional corrective action as
"urgent."9 5 In response to the second letter Acme's Baltimore divi-
sion vice president indicated that he and Park had taken action to
correct the violations in both Philadelphia and Baltimore. Al-
though a subsequent inspection of the Baltimore warehouse in
1972 revealed improvement of the problem, the FDA nevertheless
discovered evidence of continued rodent activity and food
contamination.
The Government charged Acme and Park with five counts of
violating the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Acme pleaded guilty,
Park not guilty. Park moved for judgment of acquittal at the close
of the Government's case-in-chief, asserting that because the pros-
ecution had failed to establish Park's personal involvement in the
violation, it also had failed to establish his individual liability. Cit-
ing Dotterweich, the trial court denied the motion.
As the sole defense witness, Park testified that while all of
Acme's employees were, in a general sense, under his direction, the
organizational structure of the company included a system
whereby certain business operations were assigned to department
heads who supervised their own staffs. He stated that upon receiv-
ing the 1972 FDA letter he consulted the vice president for legal
v. Park, 32 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 544 (1977); Recent Development, The Standard for
Criminal Responsibility Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act-United States
v. Park, 13 AM. CRIM. L. Rav. 299 (1975); Case Note, Prosecution of Corporate Officials
Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act- United States v. Park, 37 OHio ST. L.J.
431 (1976).




affairs, who told him that the Baltimore division vice president
"was investigating the situation immediately and would be taking
corrective action .. to reply to the letter."" Park expressed his
belief that he could not personally have handled the situation more
constructively than the manner in which he was told it was being
handled by his subordinates.
Rejecting a renewed motion for acquittal at the close of the
defense evidence, the trial court instructed the jury that it could
find Park guilty if it found that Park's position was one of "au-
thority and responsibility in the business for Acme Markets" and
that he had "a responsible relation to the situation, even though he
may not have participated personally.' 97 The jury convicted Park
on all five counts, and he was sentenced to pay a fine of $50 on
each count.
The court of appeals reversed his conviction," holding that
the instruction could have misled the jury into believing that it
could convict Park simply because he was president of the com-
pany." That interpretation, the court concluded, went well beyond
96. Id. at 664.
97. Id. at 665, n.9.
98. United States v. Park, 499 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
99. The instruction included the following language:
"[Y]ou must find beyond a reasonable doubt ....
. . I
Thirdly, that John R. Park held a position of authority in the operation of the
business of Acme Markets, Incorporated.
.. . The main issue for your determination is only... whether the Defendant
held a position of authority and responsibility within the business of Acme Markets.
. . .An individual is liable if it is clear .... that the individual had a responsible
relation to the situation, even though he may not have participated personally.
* . . [T]he fact that the Defendant is pres[id]ent and is a chief executive officer of
the Acme Markets does not require a finding of guilt.. . .The issue is, in this case,
whether the Defendant, John R. Park, by virtue of his position in the company, had a
position of authority and responsibility in the situation out of which these charges
arose."
Park, 421 U.S. at 665 n.9 (quoting trial judge's instructions to the jury).
The majority opinion in Park recognized that if parts of the instruction were viewed in
isolation of each other one might possibly conclude that the jury was misled. The Court
cautioned, however, that the charge must be read in its entirety and in the context of the
entire trial, and it concluded that the jury could only have considered the trial judge's refer-
ences to "the situation" to mean food that was stored in unsanitary conditions and that
consequently became contaminated. Id. at 674. Although faulting the imprecision of the
language, the Court concluded that the instruction was adequate. Id. at 675.
The dissenting Justices found the deficiency in the language fatal and concluded that




the parameters of Dotterweich, which did not purport to dispense
with the requirement of a wrongful act or omission to act bearing a
causal relationship to the unsanitary conditions.
The United States Supreme Court reversed and reinstated
Park's conviction. Finding that both corporate agents who person-
ally participate in conduct constituting an offense and those whose
relation to the subordinates is managerial may be held accountable
for an offense, 1 °0 the Court stated that in the latter case liability is
predicated upon an omission or failure to act. The Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act created a scheme of liability that holds a manager
responsible for a violation if the manager, by virtue of his relation-
ship to the corporation, had the power to prevent the act constitut-
ing the violation. 10 1
The Court explained that Dotterweich imposed liability on
those who possess authority and supervisory responsibility when
their failure to exercise such authority and to discharge their re-
sponsibility results in a violation.10 2 The rationale of Dotterweich,
which had been reaffirmed in later cases, was that the degree of
public interest in preventing contamination of food and drugs was
sufficiently great to warrant imposing "'the highest standard of
care' ,1as on those in the chain of distribution "who execute the
corporate mission."1' 4
The Court then identified two specific positive duties imposed
by the Act: (1) "primarily, a duty to implement measures that will
insure that violations will not occur";105 and (2) an affirmative duty
to seek out and remedy violations that do occur. The Act imposes
the highest duty of foresight and vigilance,106 and while imposition
of such a standard is perhaps onerous, the Court observed, the
public is entitled to the exercise of that degree of care by those
who hold positions of authority in business enterprises affecting
public health and welfare. They must protect those from whom
they profit1 07 by exercising their power to do whatever is necessary
to prevent or correct violations of the Act.
100. Id. at 670. The Court explained at length that the responsible share test "was not
formulated in a vacuum" but instead was a rather natural extension of an existing theory of
managerial liability. Id. at 670-71.
101. Id. at 671.
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152 (1959)).
104. Park, 421 U.S. at 672, 673.





The Court, however, left open the possibility that even if a
defendant was vested with authority to prevent or remedy viola-
tions he may nonetheless raise, by way of defense, the impossibility
of so doing. A corporate officer is not accountable for "causing" a
violation if he can establish that he was "powerless" either to pre-
vent or to correct it.108
Professor Abrams argues that while it is doubtful that the
Court intended to adopt a negligence or "limited culpability" stan-
dard,109 the majority opinion nevertheless may be read to support
the premise that criminal liability may be imposed "only where
there is a departure from a standard of care." 110 Abrams maintains
that Chief Justice Burger's opinion is "replete with language which
smacks of negligence," 1 such as "'the defendant's . . power, in
light of the duty imposed by the Act, to prevent or correct...
some measure of blameworthiness .. the scope of the duty, pro-
vide[s] the measure of culpability.' 1112
When the Court spoke of blameworthiness and culpability in
this portion of its opinion, however, it was addressing the issue of
factual rather than moral blame. "The concept of a 'responsible
relationship' to, or a 'responsible share' in, a violation of the Act
indeed imports some measure of blameworthiness," Chief Justice
Burger wrote. 1"3 But he further noted that "Congress has seen fit
to enforce the accountability of responsible corporate agents deal-
ing with products which may affect the health of consumers by pe-
nal sanctions cast in rigorous terms . . . . The considerations
which prompted the imposition of this duty, and the scope of the
duty, provide the measure of culpability."11 4 The Chief Justice ex-
plained that proof that the officer had the responsibility and the
power to prevent the violation and that he failed to fulfill the duty
to do so establishes the required causal link between the officer
and the violation. 1 5 Thus, while a corporate officer cannot be
blamed for a violation unless he is factually connected with it, the
prosecution may establish the required factual connection without
108. Id. at 673 (citing United States v. Wiesenfeld Warehouse Co., 376 U.S. 86, 91
(1964)).
109. Abrams, supra note 18, at 473.
110. Id. at 469.
111. Id.
112. Id. (citing Park, 421 U.S. at 673, 674).
113. 421 U.S. at 673.
114. Id. at 673-74.
115. "The failure thus to fulfill the duty imposed by the interaction of the corporate
agent's authority and the statute furnished a sufficient causal link." Id. at 674.
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also proving a culpable state of mind.
That the Court did not intend its reference to blameworthi-
ness in this passage to connote any requirement of a culpable
mental state is reinforced by its explicit rejection, in the same pas-
sage, of the Fourth Circuit's position regarding the Government's
burden of proof. The court of appeals had stated that Park could
not be found guilty unless the Government established "some
wrongful action" on his part.11 The appellate court continued,
"[t]hat action may be gross negligence and inattention in discharg-
ing his corporate duties and obligations or any of a host of other
acts of commission or omission. 1 17 A required showing of "per-
sonal wrongdoing," according to the court, would be consistent
with the concepts of "fairness and justice."11 8 The Fourth Circuit,
then, "wr[o]te into the statute some small degree of mens rea or
scienter as a prerequisite to liability."11 9
The Supreme Court prefaced its discussion of what makes a
corporate officer's failure to prevent a violation blameworthy with
express disapproval of the standard adopted by the lower court.
"We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that it was incumbent
upon the District Court to instruct the jury that the Government
had the burden of establishing 'wrongful action' in the sense in
which the Court of Appeals used that phrase. ' 120 Thus, while one
might well conclude that the Court's language, perhaps within an-
other context, would support the proposition that liability must be
predicated upon a finding of minimal culpability or negligence,
within the context of the Park opinion the premise is unsound.
On the effect of the objective impossibility notion introduced
in Park, Professor Abrams writes that the Court's recognition that
a corporate officer might avoid criminal liability if he can demon-
strate powerlessness to prevent or correct the violation further re-
fines the content of the responsible share standard articulated in
Dotterweich. 2 The concept of power thereby becomes intimately
related to that of responsibility, as "[r]esponsible share implies a
measure of control over the situation; powerlessness negates the
existence of that control."M 22
116. Park, 499 F.2d at 842.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 845 (Craven, J., dissenting).
120. Park, 421 U.S. at 673.




Abrams suggests, however, that the Court's choice of extreme
terminology-the term "powerlessness" and the phrase "objec-
tively impossible"-injects too much rigidity into the standard of
liability.223 Under a "corporate responsibility view of Park," which
he terms a "narrow reading" of the case, a corporate officer could
avoid liability only if he were able to demonstrate that he had no
responsibility and authority with respect to the business activity
that led to the violation.12 ' "No other kind of claim that he was
powerless would be acceptable."125 Thus, he posits, even if the in-
ability to prevent the violation were attributable to external forces,
the officer would not be powerless within the meaning of the
Court's pronouncement unless he lacked authority to control the
business process in question. 2
Moreover, Professor Abrams perceives the defense of power-
lessness as a procedural device that, like the doctrine of strict lia-
bility, serves to shift the burden of going forward on the issue of
responsibility.1 27 He concludes that under a "corporate responsibil-
ity" interpretation of Park, "the issue of whether the defendant
had responsibility in the corporate structure over the activity that
produced the violation is not in the case unless the defendant first
produces evidence on the issue. 1 2 8
Professor Abrams' observations about the effect of engrafting
the notion of objective impossibility upon the responsible share
standard may be quarreled with on several scores. First, his con-
clusion that the issue would not be "in the case" unless the defen-
dant raised it himself is contradicted both by the manner in which
the Government constructed its case against Park and by the
Court's treatment of the burden of proof issue.
It is notable that the Government called as its final witness
Acme's vice president for legal affairs and assistant secretary, who
read to the jury the corporate bylaw that specified the duties of the
chief executive officer. Those duties included responsibility for
"general and active supervision of the affairs, business, offices and
employees of the company,"129 in addition to reporting to the
123. Id.
124. Id. at 469.
125. Id. at 468.
126. Id. at 468-69.
127. Id. at 473.
128. Id. at 474. Abrams also concludes that this proposition would obtain under a
standard of care view of Park. Id.
129. 421 U.S. at 663 n.7.
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board. The legal officer testified that although Park had delegated
"normal operating duties" such as matters involving sanitation, he
assumed personal responsibility for "the big, broad, principles of
the operation of the company" and for "seeing that they all work
together."' 1 0 It seems clear, then, that the Government took the
initiative on the issue of Park's responsibility. It seems equally
clear that the Government was required to do so.
In the course of considering what burden of proof the Govern-
ment must satisfy in order to establish a violation, the Supreme
Court rejected the court of appeals' holding that the prosecution
must establish some specific wrongful action on the part of Park.
Adopting a contrary position, the Court stated:
it is . . .clear that the Government establishes a prima facie case when it
introduces evidence sufficient to warrant a finding by the trier of the facts
that the defendant had, by reason of his position in the corporation, responsi-
bility and authority either to prevent in the first instance, or promptly to
correct, the violation complained of, and that he failed to do so. 1sl
It would seem, then, that if the Government introduced no evi-
dence on this issue, or merely introduced evidence of a corporate
officer's title and position without also establishing the accompany-
ing responsibilities, the case could not go to the jury.
The Court's statement, moreover, belies the conclusion
Abrams would draw, under a corporate responsibility view of the
case, regarding the availability of the claim of powerlessness.
"Under this view of the case, a court would be required to reject a
corporate officer's claim that even though he had responsibility
over the activity in question, he had been powerless to prevent the
violation because an outside force-e.g., sabotage-had inter-
vened. ' 13 2 Inasmuch as the Court made clear that a causal rela-
tionship between the accused officer's nonfeasance and the viola-
tion is required, however, Abrams' proposition is stated too
broadly. The Governiment establishes a prima facie case by proving
the defendant's corporate office, his responsibility to prevent or
correct the violation, and his failure to do so. Proof of "[t]he fail-
ure thus to fulfill the duty imposed by the interaction of the corpo-
rate agent's authority and the statute furnishes a sufficient causal
link."1 3
Suppose, however, that the clean-up efforts at the Baltimore
130. Id. at 663.
131. Id. at 673-74.
132. Abrams, supra note 18, at 468-69.
133. Park, 421 U.S. at 674.
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warehouse were successful and that all contaminated food was re-
moved. Suppose further that a competitor of Acme Markets there-
after hired a saboteur to impersonate an FDA inspector and, unob-
trusively while in the warehouse, to deposit rat and mouse pellets
in strategic locations throughout the storage facility. If a genuine
FDA inspection occurred the following day, could Park succeed in
his claim that he was powerless to prevent the violation? It is sub-
mitted that he could.
Under the facts just posed it would have been objectively im-
possible for Park to prevent the recontamination of the ware-
house. 1 4 The Government might well be able to establish a prima
facie case against Park, for it could prove that he held a position of
authority carrying with it the responsibility to prevent violations
resulting from the storage of food under insanitary conditions and
that he had failed to do so. 13 5 It must be remembered, however,
that this is only prima facie evidence of a violation for which he
may be accountable. While on its face the Government's evidence
would establish a sufficient causal link, Park could raise in his de-
fense the claim that he was "'powerless'" to prevent this particu-
lar violation because of the intervention of external forces.13 6 If
credible, the claim would destroy the requisite causal relationship
and would therefore exculpate the officer from criminal accounta-
bility. Even under a corporate responsibility view of Park that re-
sult would obtain because the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does
not require a corporate officer to do that which is beyond his power
or which is objectively impossible for him to do. The scope of lia-
bility under the Act is not, therefore, coextensive with that of in-
surer, as Professor Abrams' hypothesis suggests.
V. THE "OBJECTIvE IMPossmITY" DEFENSE
The Supreme Court noted the possible existence of a defense
of objective impossibility as early as 1964, when a public storage
warehouseman argued that the Government was seeking to punish
the one "'who is, by the very nature of his business powerless' "137
to prevent food from being contaminated no matter how high the
standard of care he exercised. The Court concluded that the claim
134. He would not be powerless, however, "to seek out and remedy" the violation once
it did occur. Id. at 672.
135. Id. at 673-74.
136. Id. at 673 (quoting United States v. Wiesenfeld Warehouse Co., 376 U.S. 86, 91
(1964)).
137. United States v. Wiesenfeld Warehouse Co., 376 U.S. 86, 91 (1964).
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was premature, however, because of the procedural posture of the
case.
13 8
Shortly thereafter corporate and individual defendants raised
the same argument in a prosecution for storing food in unsanitary
conditions.13 9 Upholding the defendants' convictions, the Fifth Cir-
cuit noted that the prosecution's evidence unquestionably estab-
lished that the defendants had neglected to take all necessary
steps to prevent the unwholesome conditions. The court thus con-
cluded that the case did not raise a genuine issue regarding the
propriety of convicting an individual who was powerless to prevent
the violation.
After Park's reminder that objective impossibility might be
raised defensively, two Ninth Circuit opinions provided some in-
sight into how courts might treat such a claim. 140 In Professor
Abrams' view the Ninth Circuit opinions reflect a very narrow
reading of Park. He finds that while they incorporate language
that suggests a standard of care approach to liability under the
Act, they actually apply a "corporate responsibility" standard of
liability.
In the first of the cases, United States v. Y. Hata & Co., 141 a
corporation and its president were convicted of violating the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act when rice became contaminated by
"thieving and untidy birds1 142 in the company's Hawaiian food
storage warehouse. Unlike the defendant in Park, the defendants
in Hata requested an objective impossibility instruction, but the
trial judge denied the request. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
assumed that such an instruction must be given if warranted by
the facts, 143 and it therefore viewed the issue to be whether a mate-
rial question of fact existed regarding proof of the elements of the
defense.1
4
The defendants argued that when the FDA cited them for the
138. As the Wiesenfeld decision reversed a dismissal of a criminal information against
the warehouse company, the defendant had not yet had an opportunity to prove the claim
at a trial on the merits. Id. at 92.
139. United States v. Hammond Milling Co., 413 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. de-
nied, 396 U.S. 1002 (1970).
140. United States v. Y. Hata & Co., 535 F.2d 508 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828
(1976); United States v. Starr, 535 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1976).
141. 535 F.2d 508 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976).
142. 535 F.2d at 511.
143. Id. at 510 & n.3 (citing United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673, 676 (1975)).




violations they had plans to enclose the food storage area in a huge
wire cage but that they were powerless to construct the device at
that time because the needed materials had not yet arrived from
the mainland United States.
The court noted that the defendant had failed to consider the
obvious remedy of a cage until shortly before the inspections and
rejected any suggestion that it was objectively impossible for the
defendants to conceive of the idea much before that time. Use of a
caging device is hardly a novel idea, and one who exercises far less
than the highest standard of foresight and vigilance, a standard
required under Park, would realize that a caging device would sub-
stantially resolve the problem. The Park duty to remedy violations
of the Act when they occur includes the duty to consider and ex-
periment with such commonplace devices. The defendants pro-
duced no evidence tending to show that they had considered the
remedy and that their inability to obtain the required materials
had frustrated implementation of the plan.145 Thus, the Ninth Cir-
cuit agreed with the trial judge that an objective impossibility in-
struction was not warranted.
Of the opinion in Hata, Professor Abrams complains that de-
spite the defendants' offer of proof of the corrective efforts that
preceded the decision to build the cage, the court seems to have
held that the earlier efforts were insufficient as a matter of law.146
Finding more than a hint of unfairness in this, he exclaims that
"[t]he court seems to have been saying that under a claim of
powerlessness a defendant must show that he took all possible
measures immediately!"147 The problem inherent in this premise
is, in Abrams' view, that the court "seems to overlook the natural
and arguably reasonable tendency in a situation of this nature to
try different remedies sequentially, building up each time to the
next more complex and expensive remedial measure. 1 48
145. It is notable that the Government argued that the objective impossibility defense
should not be available to a corporate defendant. In the Government's view, the defense
should be available only to a corporate officer, and then only when he was "in fact powerless
to prevent or correct the violation, even by suspending the corporation's food warehousing
activity if necessary." Id. at 511. Since the court concluded that no factual support existed
for the defense in this case, it did not attempt to resolve that issue.
Although the Supreme Court has not expressly addressed this question, the Court first
acknowledged that impossibility might constitute a defense in the context of a prosecution
that apparently involved only a corporate defendant. See United States v. Wiesenfeld Ware-
house Co., 376 U.S. 86, 91 (1964).





If one were inclined to find fault with the ameliorative effects
of the objective impossibility defense, it would be difficult to mar-
shal a weaker set of facts from which to mount an attack. The evi-
dence established that the defendants in Hata were aware of the
existence and nature of the problem as early as August 1971.14'9
The two FDA inspections that led to the indictment occurred in
May and June of 1972.150 On those two occasions the inspectors
observed birds flying in and out of the food storage facility, birds
perching on overhead sprinklers, birds perching on and eating from
bags of rice, and bird droppings on some of the bags of rice.151
While the court did not require a showing of minimal culpabil-
ity or negligence in order to sustain the conviction, the violation in
Hata clearly was a culpable violation. The defendants knowingly
held food for sale under insanitary conditions for a period of about
ten months. To suggest that the warehouse operators may have
acted reasonably and that they were therefore entitled to an in-
struction on objective impossibility is tantamount to a claim of en-
titlement to continue storing and selling foodstuffs one knows to
be contaminated, provided that some ongoing effort, however inef-
fectual, is being made to correct an obvious and elementary sanita-
tion problem. It is submitted that neither Congress nor the Park
Court would have countenanced such a premise under the Act.
In the second Ninth Circuit case considered by Abrams,
United States v. Starr,152 a corporation and Starr, the corpora-
tion's secretary-treasurer, were convicted of violating the Act by
allowing food stored in a company warehouse to become contami-
nated. The first inspection leading to the indictment revealed nu-
merous violations, and the inspector personally detailed them to
the assistant treasurer of the corporation. In the presence of the
inspector the assistant treasurer reprimanded Marks, the ware-
house janitor, and instructed him to take corrective action. Marks
had not done so as of one month later when a second inspection
occurred. Marks admitted to the inspector that he had not taken
the corrective measures he had been ordered to take, and he later
falsely suggested that additional violations existed. Starr and the
corporation were charged with and convicted of violating the Act.
Starr appealed.
Although Starr was responsible for the actual operation of the
149. Hata, 535 F.2d at 511.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 509.
152. 535 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1976).
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warehouse and, therefore, had" 'the responsibility out of which the
violation grew,' -153 he asserted two grounds for the defense of im-
possibility. First, he contended that the infestation resulted from a
natural phenomenon in that the plowing of a nearby field caused
mice to seek sanctuary in the warehouse. The court rejected this
argument, stating that "with only a minimum of foresight" 15 one
would reasonably expect rodents to flee from freshly plowed fields.
Starr's second argument was that the janitor sabotaged the com-
pany by refusing to comply with the order to correct the violations.
Starr testified that Marks was hired to take care of such problems
and that he felt Marks should have done so.
The trial judge indicated that the passing of a month between
the first inspection-when Marks was reprimanded-and the sec-
ond inspection was significant. During this time Starr could have
taken additional steps to cure the violation. He could not simply
delegate the responsibility to the janitor and consider the matter
at an end, because ultimately it was Starr's responsibility to main-
tain a sanitary warehouse. Starr testified that he never checked on
the progress of the ordered clean-up. Indeed, he was ignorant of
the noncompliance until the second inspection occurred.
The court concluded that Starr failed to satisfy the foresight
and vigilance standard required by Park. Even though the janitor
was told to correct the problem, "Starr should have foreseen that,
through neglect or design, Marks might fail to follow the or-
ders. . . .Starr expected that Marks would obey his orders, but
this is not to say that noncompliance was unforeseeable, for indeed
it was not." '55
Professor Abrams is critical of the Starr decision. In his view
the court's treatment of the claim of powerlessness can only make
"one wonder what kind of evidence might suffice to substantiate
the claim."118 Indeed, he argues, if employee sabotage of the re-
sponsible officer's efforts to correct a problem does not legitimate a
claim of powerlessness, "then it is hard to conjure up a fact situa-
tion where there will not be liability if efforts to correct violations
turn out to be unsuccessful. '" 1 57
As this Article notes in its analysis of Park, the work of a sab-
oteur may provide a sufficient factual basis for sustaining a claim
153. Id. at 514-15 (quoting the district court's findings).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 516.




of objective impossibility. 158 It may be prudent, however, to draw a
general line between external forces that contribute to a violation,
such as a saboteur posing as an FDA inspector, and internal forces
that interfere with its correction, whether they consist of employee
sabotage, insubordination, or incompetence.
On the whole, Starr is not so different from Park. Recall that
Park was the sole defense witness at his trial. On cross-examina-
tion, Park stated that the responsibility for sanitation matters was
delegated to "'dependable subordinates.' 11159 He did acknowledge,
however, that with one exception 60 the same employees were re-
sponsible for sanitation in both Philadelphia and Baltimore. The
two critical FDA reports about conditions in the Baltimore ware-
house, Park conceded, indicated that the organizational process for
managing sanitation problems "'wasn't working perfectly.' ""6
Park testified that he delegated responsibility for sanitation
matters to dependable subordinates and that he trusted the orga-
nizational system in the company to function as it was intended to.
The Court viewed the apparent purpose of the testimony as an ef-
fort to establish that because he presided over a large, national
corporation, Park "had no choice but to delegate duties to those in
whom he reposed confidence, that he had no reason to suspect his
subordinates were failing to insure compliance with the Act, and
that, once violations were unearthed, acting through those subordi-
nates he did everything possible to correct them. ' 162
While declining to decide whether the evidence would have
warranted an instruction on Park's power or powerlessness to af-
fect the conditions at the Baltimore warehouse," 8 the Court did
find that the testimony created a need for rebuttal evidence. The
prosecution satisfied that need by introducing the 1970 FDA letter
regarding unsanitary conditions at the Philadelphia warehouse.
The 1970 letter established that Park had notice that his reliance
on the system was misplaced, and the evidence was properly con-
sidered in response to Park's defense that reliance on his system of
158. See supra text accompanying notes 132-36.
159. Park, 421 U.S. at 664 (quoting Park's testimony in trial court).
160. The one exception was the Baltimore division vice president. Id.
161. Id. at 664-65 (quoting Park's testimony in trial court). He also admitted that as
chief executive officer of the company he bore responsibility for" 'any result which occurs in
our company.'" Id. at 665 (quoting Park's testimony in trial court).
162. Id. at 677.
163. The Court pointedly noted that Park neglected to request an instruction that the
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Park had the power or capacity to




Although Park does not articulate a general rule that corpo-
rate officers may not justifiably rely on subordinates to perform
their assigned tasks responsibly, it does impose limits on the privi-
lege to do so with impunity. Park was given specific assurances
that a problem in a distant city would be corrected. The Baltimore
division vice president was aware of the problem and detailed, in a
letter to the FDA, corrective measures that had been taken. It is
apparent that the Baltimore Chief had immediate responsibility
for handling this matter, and the Government's own evidence es-
tablished that following the 1971 inspection "a great deal of effort"
had gone into cleaning up the warehouse.16 5
Nevertheless, because Park knew that the system for handling
sanitation matters was unreliable, he could not justifiably continue
to depend upon the very corporate mechanism whose malfunction
led to repeated sanitation problems to correct those same prob-
lems. Even though it may be objectively impossible for the chief
executive officer of a nationwide retail chain to supervise person-
ally every facet of the business at its nearly 900 locations, that is
not equivalent to a colorable claim that as president of the com-
pany he has no power to ensure that measures correcting elemen-
tary problems would be implemented.16 Park neglected to follow
through and to verify that the unsanitary conditions at the Balti-
more warehouse had in fact been corrected, and that neglect pro-
vided a legally adequate basis for his conviction.
Although the facts in Park did not involve allegations of em-
ployee sabotage as did those in Starr, the Supreme Court's treat-
ment of the delegation issue brings into question Starr's privilege
to continue relying upon delegate Marks. Marks, who was janitor
of the warehouse when the violation occurred, was reprimanded for
permitting the unsanitary conditions to exist. The sole measure
taken by management to correct the violation was that of in-
structing Marks to do what he should have done in the first in-
stance. And while the discovery of sanitation problems in the ware-
house should have alerted management to Marks' unreliability, as
was true before the first FDA inspection no one bothered to super-
vise his work or to check on his progress in cleaning up the
warehouse.
164. Id. at 677-78.
165. Brief for the Government at 4, United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
166. Park, 421 U.S. at 677 n.19.
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Is the reason that Marks failed to clean up the warehouse,
then, relevant to the issue of the manager's liability? Should it
make any difference whether the janitor's failure to follow instruc-
tions to correct the violation was a product of sheer laziness, gross
neglect, intoxication, simple incompetence, or intentional failure to
carry out instructions-for example, sabotage? Probably not. The
Starr Court articulates what the Park Court suggests-a require-
ment that a party with authority to follow through must bear the
responsibility for supervising or ensuring proper supervision once a
violation has occurred. Continued reliance on a demonstrably un-
reliable employee or corporate mechanism falls far short of
powerlessness to correct elementary sanitation problems.
VI. ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT POLICY
Although Professor Abrams finds that the Park formulation of
liability under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is an improve-
ment over a pure strict liability standard, he voices concern that
Park still permits imposition of criminal liability under circum-
stances in which it would be "unjust."' " Citing as an example the
possibility of criminally prosecuting an officer of a large corpora-
tion who neither participated in the violation nor had knowledge of
it,16s he concludes that "[i]f we are really serious about the unfair-
ness of strict liability, we should be careful not to substitute for it
a doctrine that verbalizes a less extreme standard but nevertheless
in practice produces the equivalent of a strict liability result." 6'
While recognizing the need to hold corporate officers to a high
standard of care when the health of the populace is at stake, he is
concerned that the standard ultimately adopted "should not be so
high. . . that in the corporate setting it is simply unfair to impose
criminal liability on the individual. 1 70
Professor Abrams observes, however, that adoption of a culpa-
bility approach in most instances would have minimal impact on
the ultimate result reached because the culpability of the individu-
167. Abrams, supra note 18, at 476.
168. Id. In forwarding this hypothetical, Abrams distinguishes Dotterweich on the
ground that the defendant "directly supervised the activity in question," which occurred
within the setting of a small corporation. Id. He distinguishes Park on the basis of "specific
evidence ... of his culpability in his failure to take sufficient remedial steps after he was
informed of the violations." Id.
169. Id. at 477.
170. Id. (emphasis in original).
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als who are prosecuted is "plausible on the facts"11 1 even though
the government need not prove such culpability. This point is de-
serving of further amplification because it is consistent with articu-
lated administrative enforcement policy 72 and with empirical data
as well.173
Even though the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not re-
quire a warning procedure,17 4 as a general rule the FDA does not
recommend criminal prosecution without first sending the poten-
tial defendants a warning letter. 175 Most defendants, therefore, will
have received notice of the existence of the violation and will have
had an opportunity to correct it before they become targets of a
criminal prosecution.
An FDA investigation normally begins after a field inspection
reveals a violation. The inspector prepares a report to a supervisor
in the field office detailing his findings. If the conditions at the
inspected facility are believed to warrant additional scrutiny, the
field office forwards the report to the Chief of the Compliance
Branch, who reviews it and decides whether or not further legal or
administrative action is desirable. 176 Issuance of a warning letter
more often than not precedes institution of legal proceedings,17 7
and the letter may be followed by another inspection to determine
whether adequate compliance measures have been taken. If the in-
spection reveals that the violation has not been corrected, the FDA
may institute additional administrative or legal procedures.
The FDA subjects any decision to prosecute to multilevel re-
171. Id. at 476.
172. See generally Fine, The Philosophy of Enforcement, 31 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J.
324 (1976); McConachie, The Role of the Department of Justice in Enforcing the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 31 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 333 (1976); O'Keefe, Criminal
Liability: Park Update, 32 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 392 (1977).
173. See generally Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals in the Federal System: An Em-
pirical Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1036 (1972) (a study of major
categories of agency criminal referrals to the Justice Department, including referrals from
the Food and Drug Administration). For a comparable comprehensive empirical study of
criminal prosecutions under state regulatory statutes, see Remington, Liability Without
Fault Criminal Statutes-Their Relation to Major Developments in Contemporary Eco-
nomic and Social Policy: The Situation in Wisconsin, 1956 Wis. L. REV. 625.
174. O'Keefe & Shapiro, supra note 44, at 26.
175. Id. at 25. Both FDA and Department of Justice policy favors prosecuting respon-
sible individuals along with the corporate entity. Id. at 27; McConachie, supra note 172, at
335.
176. O'Keefe & Shapiro, supra note 44, at 25.
177. "In cases of imminent hazard to health, filthy conditions, or other extraordinarily




view before the case is referred to the Department of Justice.178
Experience has shown that the FDA normally only refers for crimi-
nal prosecution cases involving repeated violations.179 Moreover,
the criteria used in reviewing a case before referral for criminal
prosecution generally include consideration not only of the serious-
ness of the violation-that is, whether it concerns an obvious gross
violation such as maintenance of a filthy facility or whther the
violation exposes the public to risk of potential danger-but also
the existence of evidence of knowledge, intent, or some other cul-
pable mental state.180 In most cases that are referred for criminal
prosecution the FDA has some evidence that the individuals who
will be prosecuted had knowledge of the violation. 81
. Finally, an FDA recommendation does not require the Justice
Department to prosecute the case. The Justice Department, how-
ever, declines to prosecute relatively few FDA cases,182 and it is
thought that FDA enforcement policies "are shaped by the
agenc[y]'s prediction of the prosecutor's response to the existence
of alternative remedies."'183 The fairly consistent result is that "re-
peated violators are prosecuted for acts which are handled in a
noncriminal fashion where a first or infrequent offender is
concerned."
84
Thus, articulated administrative enforcement policy, which is
consistent with empirical data, tends to ameliorate the apparent
harshness of a strict liability standard under the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act and to minimize the potential for unfairness in the
prosecution of corporate officers who are remote from the violation.
This suggests that the first of the mechanisms Justice Frankfurter
was willing to trust to fairly identify responsible parties-that of
"the good sense of prosecutors"s--may have proven reliable after
all.
178. Id. at 26-27. "[In practice, FDA officials recognized the possibility of some un-
evenness of application, and it is for this reason that the Agency has provided for the multi-
ple review of cases to assure as much fairness and uniformity of action as possible." Id. at
27.
179. Rabin, supra note 173, at 1060.
180. Fine, supra note 172, at 328-32; O'Keefe, supra note 172, at 400-02.
181. Fine, supra note 172, at 329. See also supra note 79.
182. The Justice Department declines to prosecute about 10% of referred cases con-
cerning food and drug violations, as contrasted with an estimated 40% of referred cases
concerning gun control violations. Rabin, supra note 173, at 1091.
183. Id. at 1060.
184. Id.
185. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943).
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VII. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The Supreme Court's analysis of liability under the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act has potentially far-reaching practical and
legal implications. Dotterwbeich and Park may have profound im-
pact on corporate structure and governance, for instance. Since
personal involvement in the offending transaction is not a prereq-
uisite to holding a corporate officer personally accountable, the re-
sponsible share standard of liability seems destined to affect the
system of delegation upon which managers of the modern business
corporation must rely.
Insofar as Dotterweich and Park may influence subsequent ju-
dicial developments, cases decided under the Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act seem not to provide a unique occasion for employing a
responsible share standard of liability. Indeed, there is at present
some evidence that the various components of the Court's analysis
in those cases may prove useful within other regulatory contexts. 86
In that event, courts will be called upon to make discerning judg-
ments about the outer parameters of the doctrine and to ascertain
appropriate limitations on its applicability to other federal stat-
utes. The characteristics of the regulatory scheme that prompted
adoption of the responsible share standard and the theoretical un-
186. Various components of the Dotterweich-Park analysis have been cited with ap-
proval in cases concerning criminal violations of such statutes as (1) the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act §§ 2-7, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-708 (1976), see United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d
902 (2d Cir. 1978) (using Park and Dotterweich as authority for proposition that omission to
perform duty may be basis of corporation's liability), (2) the Economic Stablization Act of
1970 § 205, 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1976), see United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 408 F. Supp. 450
(W.D. Pa. 1975) (applying Park and Dotterweich in context of statutory requirement of
willfulness), (3) the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976), see United States v. Wise, 370
U.S. 405 (1962); see also United States v. Rachal, 473 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 927 (1973) (prosecution under Securities Act of 1933, quoting Wise extensively); but cf.
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978) (holding intent required),
(4) the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1276 (1976), see United States
v. Klehman, 397 F.2d 406 (7th Cir. 1968) (but dismissing criminal information against indi-
vidual defendant because prior testimony under subpoena conferred immunity), (5) the Fil-
led Milk Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 61-64 (1976), see Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 140
F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1944) (upholding convictions of individual defendants responsible for pro-
moting interstate business without evidence of personal participation in or knowledge of
offending shipments), (6) the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678
(1976), see United States v. Pinkston-Hollar, Inc., 4 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1697 (D. Kan. 1976)
(citing Park as authority supporting prosecution of corporate vice president as aider and
abettor of corporation), and (7) the Federal Water Pollution Control Act §§ 301-309, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1311-1319 (1976), see United States v. Frezzo Bros., 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980) (citing Park and Dotterweich as authority for proposition
that defendants' argument that they could not be held individually responsible when indict-
ment charged them as corporate officers was meritless).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
derpinnings of liability under that standard are thus critically
significant.
That the penal provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act fit the public welfare offense model is of primary importance.
The Act is designed to protect human health and safety, and a
violation of the statute will usually, though not necessarily,8 7 en-
danger these important interests. Since the public welfare offense
model provided the analytical framework within which the Court
formulated the responsible share standard of liability, that model
also provides an essential context for assessing the content, limits,
and fairness of the standard. If one loses sight of that context, in-
ferences and assumptions that might otherwise be sound may be
unwarranted given the factual, legal, and analytical framework of
Dotterweich and Park.
Professor Abrams, for example, postulates that certain lan-
guage in Park may be read to require culpability as a prerequisite
to criminal liability under the Act.188 Reading the Court's language
in isolation from the underlying characteristics of the regulatory
scheme, Abrams neglects to note that the Court used language that
customarily connotes moral blame or mental culpability for the
very different purpose of supplying the requirement of a causal re-
lationship between the responsible officer and the violation.8 " One
may be deemed culpable under the Act if he is factually connected
to the violation, the Court tells us. That required nexus, however,
may be established without also proving a culpable state of mind.
A second important characteristic of the scheme of liability
under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is that the statute im-
poses two affirmative duties upon corporate officers and employ-
ees-the duty to prevent violations from occurring, and the duty to
discover and correct violations if they do occur-and personal re-
sponsibility for a violation may be predicated upon a failure to dis-
charge those duties effectively. 90 Contrary to Abrams' postulate
that the question of corporate responsibility is not in issue unless
raised by the defendant, 91 however, the responsibility of the of-
187. See, e.g., United States v. H. Wool & Sons, 215 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1954) (prosecu-
tion for repackaging butter weighing less than a pound in cartons labeled one pound net
weight). Whether the consequences of a violation are in fact injurious may be wholly fortui-
tous. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 258 (1952).
188. See supra text accompanying notes 110-12.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 113-15.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 100-02.
191. See supra text accompanying note 128.
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ficer or employee is of critical importance to the Government's
case. The Act imposes the duties in question only on those within
the corporation who have a responsible relation to the business
process that leads to a violation.1 92 Thus, the essential elements of
a prima facie case are proof that the officer held a corporate posi-
tion carrying with it the responsibility and authority to prevent
and correct such violations, and proof that he failed to do so.1 3
A third essential point that must be considered in tandem
with the second is the Court's recognition that a claim of objective
impossibility or powerlessness may relieve a corporate officer of
criminal responsibility for a violation. Such recognition serves the
function of qualifying the officer's duty to prevent the violation.
Although Professor Abrams maintains that unless it is viewed
within a standard of care context, a claim of powerlessness
amounts to no more than a claim that the officer lacked responsi-
bility and authority over the troublesome transaction,'" the
Court's requirement of a causal relationship between officer and
violation undercuts a necessary predicate of the hypothesis. A cor-
porate officer may establish powerlessness to prevent a violation,
even in the face of proof that he had responsibility and authority
in the matter, by injecting into the case a factual element that ne-
gates the existence of an otherwise apparent causal link between
his position of authority and the violation.
To constitute a criminal omission, a corporate officer's failure
to prevent a violation must be related to that which it was within
his power to do. One may possess and exercise general responsibil-
ity and authority over the business process through which a viola-
tion occurs and still be powerless to prevent the particular viola-
tion. It would be possible to conclude, for example, that an officer
would possess the power to prevent violations resulting from the
failure of a corporate mechanism over which he held a measure of
control, while at the same time concluding that it would have been
objectively impossible for him to have prevented a violation result-
ing from external intervention.19 '
Finally, inasmuch as the Act imposes liability for mere failure
to prevent or correct a violation without requiring proof that the
defendant possessed a culpable mental state, inattention to detail
in the handling of corporate assignments may result in a violation
192. See supra text accompanying notes 100-01.
193. See supra text accompanying note 131.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 123-25.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 132-36.
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for which a corporate officer may be personally accountable. As
Professor Abrams observes, however, while this aspect of the es-
tablished standard of liability leaves open the potential for un-
fairly singling out a corporate officer for a violation about which he
had no knowledge and with which he had no personal involvement,
the facts in the reported cases generally seem consistent with an
inference of at least minimal culpability.19 e Indeed the statutory
scheme, though authorizing imposition of strict liability, is tem-
pered by a selective enforcement policy that screens out technical
violations and seeks to utilize the criminal process when a very se-
rious violation has occurred and when grounds for inferring a cul-
pable state of mind are present.19 7
It is this last point that engenders real concern about the po-
tential unfairness inherent in a strict liability regulatory scheme.
Concern over judicial decisions that embrace the responsible share
standard of liability must relate in some measure to the impact of
the standard on the time honored privilege of corporate officers
and managers to delegate responsibility and authority. The in-
creased size and complexity of the modern business corporation
correspondingly require delegation of greater authority to more
employees. 98 Because extensive delegation is essential, it is con-
ceivable that high ranking officers and managers may have little or
no involvement in the sphere of operations where wrongdoing for
which they may be held personally accountable occurs.
These facts of modern corporate life may well prompt the
complaint that within the large business corporation, it is impracti-
cal to require that officers with authority over a business process
must prevent even menial employees from allowing a violation to
occur. In other contexts the blunt judicial response to such a sug-
gestion has been that "[tihe checking and elimination of. . . obvi-
ously illegal practices is not shown to [be] any more difficult than
other details of a nation-wide industry."199
That the response in cases decided under the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act has been equally direct may be a function of judicial
concern that the goals of the regulatory scheme under considera-
196. See supra text accompanying notes 167-73.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 174-85.
198. That being the case, "'[there are not enough seats on the Board of Directors,'"
nor enough official titles for all corporate employees who have been delegated the "'power,
authority, and responsibility for decision and action."' Commonwealth v. Beneficial Finance
Co., 360 Mass. 188, 275, 275 N.E.2d 33, 83 (1971) (quoting the trial judge in the first trial).
199. United States v. Armour & Co., 168 F.2d 342, 343 (3d Cir. 1948).
[Vol. 35:13371380
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
tion would not otherwise be achieved. The purposes of the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, like those of many other regulatory stat-
utes, are in large measure directly related to functions normally
delegated to subordinate employees who "often exercise more re-
sponsibility in the everyday operations of the corporation than the
directors or officers."' 00 Thus, while it is clear that a system of del-
egation is essential within the corporate setting, the Court in Dot-
terweich and Park made equally clear its view that corporate exec-
utives must bear the responsibility for "execut[ing] the corporate
mission."201 Given that responsibility, the Court has engrafted
upon the power to delegate a corresponding duty to supervise and
control those to whom management of the details of the corporate
mission have been entrusted. The scheme of liability under the Act
will countenance delegation of immediate, but not of ultimate, au-
thority and responsibility.
200. Commonwealth v. Beneficial Finance Co., 360 Mass. 188, 275, 275 N.E.2d 33, 83
(1971) (emphasis in original).
201. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672 (1975).
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